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Large deviation analysis for quantum security via
smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2
Masahito Hayashi
Abstract
It is known that the security evaluation can be done by smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 in the classical and quantum
settings when we apply universal2 hash functions. Using the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2, we derive security bounds
for L1 distinguishability and modified mutual information criterion under the classical and quantum setting, and have derived
these exponential decreasing rates. These results are extended to the case when we apply ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions.
Further, we apply this analysis to the secret key generation with error correction.
Index Terms
exponential rate, non-asymptotic setting, secret key generation, universal hash function, almost dual universal2 hash function
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
When a random number is correlated to the third party, the random number is not secure. In this case, in order to amplify
the privacy, one can apply a hash function to the original random number. This process is called privacy amplification or secret
key extraction. Bennett et al. [4] and Ha˚stad et al. [21] proposed to use universal2 hash functions for privacy amplification
and derived two universal hashing lemma, which provides an upper bound for leaked information based on Re´nyi entropy of
order 2. In the quantum setting, Renner and Ko¨nig [38] showed that the trace norm of the difference between the real state
and the ideal state is universally composable. Hence, we use the trace norm and call it the L1 distinguishability criterion.
Renner [22] extended two universal hashing lemma to the quantum case and evaluated the L1 distinguishability criterion with
universal2 hash functions based on a quantum version of conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2. In order to apply Renner’s two
universal hashing lemma to a realistic setting, Renner [22] attached the smoothing to min entropy, which is a lower bound
on the above quantum version of conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2. That is, he proposed to maximize the min-entropy
among the sub-states whose trace norm distance to the true state is less than a given threshold. However, it is not easy to
find the maximizing sub-state. Instead of the rigorous maximization of min entropy under this condition, we can consider a
lower bound of the maximum of min entropy. In the following, we say that this type lower bound or the method based on this
type lower bound is an approximate smoothing of min entropy. In contrast with an approximate smoothing, we say that the
tight value of min entropy under the given condition or the method based on the tight value is the rigorous smoothing of min
entropy.
Indeed, the same difficulty still holds even for the maximum of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 under the same condition. Hence,
we can consider an approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2. Considering an approximate smoothing of Re´nyi
entropy of order 2, the previous paper [17] derived an upper bound of the L1 distinguishability criterion after an application of
universal2 hash functions in the classical setting. In the n-fold independent and identical case, the upper bound yields a lower
bound of the exponential decreasing rate of the L1 distinguishability criterion. The obtained lower bound is tight with no side
information [17]. The same fact is also shown with classical side information by combination of [71] and the forthcoming paper
[53]. This fact shows that the approximate smoothing gives a sub-distribution that is sufficiently close to the sub-distribution
maximizing the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 in the classical setting. However, no study treats the approximate smoothing of Re´nyi
entropy of order 2 in the quantum case. One of the purposes of this paper is to attach the approximate smoothing of Re´nyi
entropy of order 2 and to evaluate the L1 distinguishability criterion in the quantum case.
Further, when we employ the rigorous smoothing of min entropy instead of approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of
order 2, we can derive another lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of the L1 distinguishability criterion. When
there is no side information, it has been shown in [17] that the lower bound based on the rigorous smoothing of min entropy
is not tight, i.e., strictly weaker than the bound based on the approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 given in
[17]. Further, the paper [71] showed the same fact when the side information classical. Due to this superiority of approximate
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2smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 over the rigorous smoothing of min entropy, it is natural to extend the bound given by
[17] to the quantum case.
The security of secret key generation by universal2 hush function has been discussed mainly in the cryptography community
and has not been studied in the information theory community while the problem can be described by information theoretic
quantity. However, the mutual information has not been discussed in this topic while the mutual information has been widely
accepted as the criterion of information security by so many papers [67], [68], [7], [6], [69], [70]. In fact, the security of the
wiretap channel model has been mainly discussed with the mutual information among information theory community [40],
[41], [42], [35]. Watanabe [39] gave an interesting example in the classical setting, in which, the mutual information is not
close to zero while the L1 distinguishability criterion is close to zero. His example suggests the demand of the convergence of
the mutual information. Therefore, it is needed to evaluate the security based on the mutual information as well as the security
based on the L1 distinguishability criterion because so many recent literatures [34], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61],
[62], [63], [64], [65] still accept the mutual information.
However, the mutual information does not reflect the uniformity while it reflects the independence. In order to address the
uniformity as well as leaked information, we need the modification of mutual information, which is called the modified mutual
information criterion and is explained in Subsection II-C. As is shown in Appendix A, if we suppose several natural conditions
for the security criterion, it is limited to the modified mutual information criterion. Hence, it is needed to evaluate the modified
mutual information criterion as well as the L1 distinguishability criterion.
In fact, when one of two security criteria goes to zero exponentially, the other also goes to zero exponentially due to the
relations given in Subsection II-C. Hence, the asymptotic key generation rate does not depend on the choice of the security
criterion. However, the relations given in Subsection II-C cannot decide one of their exponential decreasing rates from the
other exponent. Hence, we need to consider both exponents separately.
B. Main results
As our result, first, we obtain upper bounds of the above two kinds of secrecy criteria when Alice and Bob share the
same random number and Eve has a correlated quantum state by using approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2
(Theorems 24, and 25). This problem is called the secret key generation without errors. Then, in the independent and identical
distributed (i.i.d.) case, we obtain lower bounds on the exponential decreasing rate of the above two kinds of secrecy criteria
(Theorems 26). We also show that the obtained lower bound for universal composable criterion is tight in a typical example,
in which, the leaked information is given as a pure state and can be regarded as the environment of Pauli channel. This fact
suggests the superiority of our method even in the quantum setting.
Further, we apply this result to the case when there exist errors between Alice’s and Bob’s random variables and Eve has
a correlated quantum state (Theorems 29, and 31). This problem is called the secret key generation with error correction.
The classical case has been treated by Ahlswede & Csisza´r[7], Maurer[6], and Muramatsu[10] et al. Renner [22] treated the
quantum case while he did not discuss the exponential decreasing rate. Our analysis derives the exponential decreasing rate
even for the secret key generation with error correction (Theorems 32 and 34). For derivation of these results, we need to
invent several information quantities and several original technical lemmas, which are given in Section II.
Further, we should note that the presentation style of this paper has is different from that of existing researches [11], [22],
[37]. with respect to security evaluation in the single-shot form. These papers[11], [22], [37] bound the length of generated
keys when the amount of leaked information is fixed. In contrast, this paper bounds the amount of leaked information when
the length of generated keys is fixed. The latter style is useful for evaluation of the exponential decreasing rate.
C. Generalization of main results
Recently, Tomamichel et al. [37] extended two universal hashing lemma, i.e., they showed the security with a larger class of
hash functions, which is the class of ε-almost universal2 hash functions in the sense of [1], [2] when ε is close to 1 while they
[37] used a different terminology. Tsurumaru et al [19] proposed the concept “ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions” for linear
universal2 hash functions, which are defined as the dual functions of ε-almost universal2 hash functions. They also showed
that the ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions contain the original universal2 hash functions when ε = 2. Tsurumaru et al
[19] showed the security of ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions when ε increases polynomially with respect to the coding
length while Tomamichel et al. [37] showed the security of ε-almost universal2 hash functions when ε is close to 1. Tsurumaru
et al [19] also gave an insecure example for 2-almost universal2 hash functions over the finite field F2. This example suggests
that ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions have a larger expandability than ε-almost universal2 hash functions. Further, the
forthcoming paper [46] gives concrete examples of ε-almost universal2 hash functions that have a smaller calculation amount
and a smaller number of random variables than the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix, which is a typical
example of universal2 hash functions. Hence, it is useful from a applied viewpoint to evaluate the security with ε-almost dual
universal2 hash functions.
On the other hand, Dodis and Smith [12] proposed the concept “δ-biased family” for a family of random variables. The
concept “ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions” can be converted to a part of “δ-biased family”[12], [19]. Indeed, Dodis
3et al.[12] and Fehr et al.[13] showed a security lemma (Proposition 16). Employing this conversion and the above security
lemma by [12], [13], we derive a variant of two universal hashing lemma for “ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions” while
Tsurumaru et al [19] showed the security for this class of hash function by evaluating the virtual decoding phase error probability
by using the relation between the virtual phase error correction and privacy amplification. The variant can be regarded as a
kind of generalization of two universal hashing lemma by Renner [22]. Replacing the role of two universal hashing lemma
by Renner [22] by this variant, we can extend the above result for universal2 hash functions to the case of the application of
“ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions”, which is a wider class of hash functions than universal2 hash functions (Lemma 23
and Theorems 27, 30, 31, 33, and 35).
D. Relation with second order analysis
In the i.i.d. case, when the rate of generated random numbers is smaller than the entropy rate (or conditional entropy rate)
of the original information source, it is possible to generate the random variable, in which, the L1 distinguishability criterion
approaches zero asymptotically. In the realistic setting, we can manipulate only a finite size operation. In order to treat the
performance in the finite length setting, we have two kinds of formalism for the i.i.d. setting.
The first one is the second order formalism, in which, we focus on the asymptotic expansion up to the second order
√
n
of the length of generated keys ln as ln = Hn + C
√
n + o(
√
n) with the constant constraint for the L1 distinguishability
criterion. The second one is the exponent formalism, in which, we fixed the generation rate R := ln/n and evaluate the
exponential decreasing rate of convergence of the L1 distinguishability criterion. In the exponent formalism, it is not sufficient
to show that the security parameter goes zero exponentially, and it is required to explicitly give lower and/or upper bounds
for the exponential decreasing rate. The exponent formalism has been studied by various information theoretical problems,
e.g., channel coding[9], [33], source coding[44], [34], [36], and wire-tap channel[35], [18]. In the quantum case, the same
topic has been studied also in channel coding[20], source coding[43], wire-tap channel[50], and entanglement concentration
[49], [51]. As the second order formalism, the optimal coding length with the fixed error probability has been derived up to
the second order
√
n in the various setting [28], [29], [30] in the case of classical channel coding. The previous paper [29]
treats the secret key generation with the second order formalism based on the information spectrum approach [32], which is
closely related to ǫ-smooth min-entropy. Then, another previous paper [27] discusses the randomness extraction with quantum
side information with the second order formalism by using the relation with ǫ-smooth min-entropy [22] and quantum versions
of the information spectrum [15], [26]. The classical case of the result [27] can be regarded as a finite-length bound based
on smoothing of min entropy. Note that, as is mentioned by Han [32], the information spectrum approach can not yield the
optimal exponent of error probability in the channel coding. This fact suggests that we have to treat the exponent formalism
with a method different from the second order formalism.
Since the secret key generation by universal2 hash functions has been studied mainly in the cryptography community, it
has not been studied with the exponent formalism sufficiently while the exponential decreasing rate is a standard topic in the
information theory community. Since the exponential decreasing rate of the decoding error probability in the source coding is
characterized by Re´nyi entropy in the classical [44] and the quantum [43] case, many information theoretical people might be
interested in whether a similar characterization holds in the secret key generation.
Recently, the previous paper [17] derived an exponential decreasing rate of leaked information in the L1 distinguishability
criterion in the classical setting. The tightness of the rate is shown in the forthcoming paper [53]. Based on the results [17],
[27], another recent paper [52] numerically dealt with the L1 distinguishability criterion in the independently and identically
distribution of the binary distribution with the finite-length setting. It compared the bound based on the second order formalism
and the bound based on the exponent formalism in this setting. It numerically showed that the comparative merits between
both depend on the length of the data and the required amount of the L1 distinguishability criterion. That is, when the length
of the data is not so many and the required amount of the L1 distinguishability criterion is too small, the bound based on
the exponent formalism is better than the bound based on the second order formalism. Indeed, when the required amount of
the L1 distinguishability criterion is too small, the convergence of the second order rate is not uniform. Hence, the second
order formalism does not necessarily work properly for an approximation of the finite-length case. In such a case, from a
mathematical viewpoint, we often take the limit of the length of generated keys under the condition that the required amount
of the L1 distinguishability criterion depends on the length of the data because such a limit often gives a better approximation
of the finite-length case. The exponent formalism is a particular case of this type of limit. The numerical analysis in [52]
shows the importance of the exponent formalism when the required amount of the L1 distinguishability criterion is too small
at least in the classical case.
While the paper [27] derives a finite-length bound achieving the optimal second order rate by using smoothing of min
entropy, the bound in the classical case requires the evaluation of the tail probability, which causes the following drawback.
In the case of binary distribution, the tail probability can be numerically calculated. Otherwise, its calculation is not easy
when the data has a huge size. Hence, we often apply the Berry-Esseen theorem (the central limit theorem). However, the
convergence of Berry-Esseen theorem is not so good when the tail probability is too small. Instead of Berry-Esseen theorem,
we often apply Chernoff bound, which essentially gives the exponential decreasing rate. This is because Chernoff bound gives
4a smaller upper bound of the tail probability than Berry-Esseen theorem in this case. When the tail probability is bounded by
Chernoff bound, this type bound essentially gives an exponential decreasing upper bound based on an approximate smoothing
of min entropy. This fact suggests the importance of the exponent formalism when the data has a huge size. We have the
similar importance of the exponent formalism in the quantum case because the numerical calculation based on the bound given
in [27] is more difficult in the quantum case except for the special example given in [27]. Hence, we need to discuss the
finite-length bound given in [27] from the exponent formalism. As is shown in the paper [71], the upper bound by the rigorous
smoothing of min entropy does not give the optimal exponential decreasing rate when the side information is classical. That
is, the finite-length bound given in [27] cannot attain the optimal exponent, and the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 is
required for the optimal exponent. Therefore, this paper addresses only the smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 under the
exponent formalism,
E. Organization
Now, we give the outline of the preliminary parts. In Section II, we introduce the information quantities for evaluating the
security and derive several useful inequalities for the quantum case. We also give a clear definition for security criteria. In
section III, we introduce several class of hash functions (universal2 hash functions and ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions).
We clarify the relation between ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions and δ-biased family. We also derive an ε-almost dual
universal2 version of Renner’s two universal hashing lemma [22, Lemma 5.4.3](Lemma 17) based on Lemma for δ-biased
family given by Dodis et al.[12] and Fehr et al.[13] in the classical and quantum setting. These parts give the definitions for
concepts and quantities describing the main results. The latter preliminary parts are more technical and used for proofs of
the main results. In section IV, under the universal2 condition or the ε-almost dual universal2 condition, we evaluate the L1
distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information based on Re´nyi entropy of order 2 for the quantum setting.
Next, we outline the main results. In Section V, we obtain a suitable bound for the quantum setting in the single-shot setting
by attaching an approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 to the evaluation obtained in the previous section. In
Section VI, we derive an exponential decreasing rate for both criteria for the quantum setting when we simply apply hash
functions and there is no error between Alice’s and Bob’s information.
In Section VII, we proceed to the secret key generation with error correction for the quantum setting. In this case, we need
error correction as well as the privacy amplification. We derive Gallager bound for the error probability in this setting. We
also derived upper bounds for the L1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information for a given sacrifice rate.
Based on these upper bounds, we derive the exponential decreasing rates for both criteria.
In Section VIII, we apply our result to the QKD case. That is, the state is given by the quantum communication via Pauli
channel, which is a typical case in quantum key distribution. For this example, we showed that our approximate smoothing is
tight in the sense of exponents. This evaluation is shown in Appendix E.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED RESULTS.
task setting hash functions L1 MMI
PV
single-shot
universal2
(68) in Lemma 20
(73) in Corollary 22
(80), (81) in Theorem 24
(69) in Lemma 20
(72) in Corollary 21
(86) in Theorem 25
ε-almost
dual universal2
(74) and (75) in Lemma 23
(80), (81) in Theorem 24
(76) and (77) in Lemma 23
(86) in Theorem 25
exponent
universal2 (99) in Theorem 26 (100) in Theorem 26(106)
P (n)-almost
dual universal2 (101) in Theorem 27
(102) in Theorem 27
(106)
PV &
fixed EC
single-shot
universal2 (115) in Theorem 29 (116) in Theorem 29
ε-almost
dual universal2 (117) in Theorem 30 (118) in Theorem 30
exponent
universal2 (124) in Theorem 32 (125) in Theorem 32
P (n)-almost
dual universal2 (124) in Theorem 33 (125) in Theorem 33
PV &
randomized EC
single-shot
universal2
no improvement
(120) of Theorem 31
ε-almost
dual universal2 (119) of Theorem 31
exponent
universal2 (127) in Theorem 34
P (n)-almost
dual universal2 (127) in Theorem 35
Roman letters express obtained results. Italic letters express existing results or results with the same performance as existing results. PV is privacy amplification.
EC is error correction. L1 is the L1 distinguishability criterion. MMI is the modified mutual information criterion. P (n) is a polynomial.
5II. PREPARATION
A. Information quantities for single system
1) Case of sub-states: In order to discuss the security problem in the quantum systems, we prepare several information
quantities in the single quantum system. In the following, a non-negative Hermitian matrix ρ is called a sub-state when Tr ρ ≤ 1.
First, we define the following quantities:
D(ρ‖σ) := Tr ρ(log ρ− log σ) (1)
ψ(s|ρ‖σ) := logTr ρ1+sσ−s (2)
ψ(s|ρ‖σ) := logTr ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2. (3)
Then, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The functions s 7→ ψ(s|ρ‖σ), ψ(s|ρ‖σ) are convex. In particular, they are strictly convex when ρ and σ are not
completely mixed.
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2: ψ(s|ρ‖σ)s and
ψ(s|ρ‖σ)
s are monotonically increasing with respect to s in (0,∞) and (−∞). In particular, they are
strictly monotonically increasing with respect to s when ρ and σ are not completely mixed.
For any quantum operation Λ, the following information processing inequalities
D(Λ(ρ)‖Λ(σ)) ≤ D(ρ‖σ), ψ(s|Λ(ρ)‖Λ(σ)) ≤ ψ(s|ρ‖σ) (4)
hold for s ∈ (0, 1][14, (5,30),(5.41)]. However, this kind of inequality does not fold for ψ(s|ρ‖σ) in general.
Lemma 3: The relation
ψ(s|ρ‖σ) ≤ ψ(s|ρ‖σ) (5)
holds for s ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 3 is shown in Appendix B. For the latter discussion, we define the pinching map, which is used for our proof of
another lemma. For a given Hermitian matrix X , we focus on its spectral decomposition X =
∑v
i=1 xiEi, where v is the
number of the eigenvalues of X . Then, the pinching map EX is defined as
EX(ρ) :=
∑
i
EiρEi. (6)
Then, the inequality
ρ ≤ vEσ(ρ). (7)
holds[14, Lemma 3.8],[15]. Inequality (7) is used in the proof of Lemma 3.
2) Case of normalized states: When ρ and σ are normalized states, we can show several additional useful properties as
follows. In this case, the inequality D(ρ‖σ) ≥ 0 holds. The equality holds if and only if ρ = σ.
Since ψ(0|ρ‖σ) = 0 and ψ(0|ρ‖σ) = 0, we have lims→0 1sψ(s|ρ‖σ) = D(ρ‖σ) and lims→0 1sψ(s|ρ‖σ) = D(ρ‖σ). Hence,
Lemma 2 yields the following lemma.
Lemma 4: When ρ and σ are normalized states, we have
−ψ(−s|ρ‖σ) ≤ sD(ρ‖σ) ≤ ψ(s|ρ‖σ) (8)
−ψ(−s|ρ‖σ) ≤ sD(ρ‖σ) ≤ ψ(s|ρ‖σ) (9)
for s > 0.
B. Information quantities in composite system
1) Case of joint sub-state: Next, we prepare several information quantities in the composite system HA ⊗HE , in which,
HA is a classical system spanned by the basis {|a〉}. A composite sub-state ρ is called a c-q sub-state when it has a form
ρA,E =
∑
a PA(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a, in which the conditional state ρE|a is normalized. For a given c-q state ρA,E , we define
the sub-states ρE := TrAρA,E and ρA := TrEρA,E . Then, we define the normalized states ρE,normal := ρE/Tr ρE and
ρA,normal := ρA/Tr ρA. Then, the von Neumann entropies and Re´nyi entropies of order 1 + s are given as
H(A,E|ρA,E) := −Tr ρA,E log ρA,E
H1+s(A,E|ρA,E) := −1
s
logTr ρ1+sA,E
6with s ∈ R \ {0}.
Quantum versions of the conditional entropy and the min entropy, and two kinds of quantum versions of conditional Re´nyi
entropy of order 1 + s are given as
H(A|E|ρA,E) := H(A,E|ρA,E)−H(E|ρE,normal)
and
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E) :=− log ‖(IA ⊗ ρ−1/2E,normal)ρA,E(IA ⊗ ρ−1/2E,normal)‖,
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) :=−1
s
logTr ρ1+sA,E(IA ⊗ ρ−sE,normal),
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) :=−1
s
logTr ρ
1+s
2
A,E(IA ⊗ ρ−s/2E,normal)ρ
1+s
2
A,E(IA ⊗ ρ−s/2E,normal)
with s ∈ R \ {0}. These quantities can be written in the following way:
H(A|E|ρA,E) = log |A| −D(ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE,normal) (10)
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = log |A| − 1
s
ψ(s|ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE,normal) (11)
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = log |A| − 1
s
ψ(s|ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE,normal), (12)
where ρmix,A is the completely mixed state on HA. When we replace ρE,normal by another normalized state σE on HE , we
obtain the following generalizations:
H(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := log |A| −D(ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ σE)
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := log |A| − 1
s
ψ(s|ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ σE)
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := log |A| − 1
s
ψ(s|ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ σE)
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := − log ‖(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E,normal)ρA,E(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E )‖.
Lemma 3 implies that
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (13)
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Using Lemma 2, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5: H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) and H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) are monotonically decreasing with respect to s in (0,∞) and
(−∞, 0). In particular, they are strictly monotonically decreasing with respect to s in (0,∞) and (−∞, 0) when ρA,E and σE
are not completely mixed.
Further, since
e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = Tr ρA,E(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E )ρA,E(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E )
≤‖(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E )ρA,E(IA ⊗ σ−1/2E )‖ = e−Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE),
Lemma 5 implies the relation H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) for s ∈ (0, 1]. A similar relation H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) has been shown for s ∈ (0, 1] in [24].
When we apply a quantum operation Λ on HE , since it does not act on the classical system A, (4) implies that
H(A|E||Λ(ρA,E)‖Λ(σE)) ≥ H(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (14)
H1+s(A|E|Λ(ρA,E)‖Λ(σE)) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (15)
When we apply the function f to the classical random number a ∈ A, H(f(A), E|ρA,E) ≤ H(A,E|ρA,E), i.e.,
H(f(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ H(A|E|ρA,E). (16)
2) Case of joint normalized state: When the joint state ρA,E is normalized, we can show several additional useful properties
as follows. In this case, since D(ρE‖σE) ≥ 0, we obtain
H(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = H(A|E|ρA,E) +D(ρE‖σE) ≥ H(A|E|ρA,E). (17)
Further, using Lemma 4, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6: In particular,
H1−s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ H(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE), (18)
H1−s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ H(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (19)
7for s > 0.
Now, we introduce another kind of conditional Re´nyi entropy for a joint normalized state as
HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) := −
1 + s
s
logTrE(TrAρ
1+s
A,E)
1
1+s .
This quantity can be expressed as
HG1+s(A|E|PA,E) = −
1 + s
s
φ(
s
1 + s
|A|E|ρA,E)
by using the Gallager type function [17]:
φ(s|A|E|ρA,E) := logTrE(TrAρ1/(1−s)A,E )1−s = log TrE(
∑
a
PA(a)
1/(1−s)ρ
1/(1−s)
E|a )
1−s.
Taking the limit s→ 0, we obtain
lim
s→0
HG1+s(A|E|PA,E) = lim
s→0
φ(s|A|E|ρA,E)
s
=
dφ(s|A|E|ρA,E)
ds
|s=0
=H(E|A|ρA,E)−H(E|ρA,E) +H(A|ρA,E) = −H(A|E|ρA,E). (20)
Then, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 7: The relation
max
σ
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = HG1+s(A|E|PA,E) (21)
holds for s ∈ (−1,∞). The maximum can be realized when σE = (TrAρ1+sA,E)1/(1+s)/TrE(TrAρ1+sA,E)1/(1+s).
The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix D.
As a corollary of Lemma 7, we have the following.
Corollary 8: The map s 7→ HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) is monotonically decreasing for s ∈ (−1,∞). In particular, it is strictly
decreasing for s ∈ (−1,∞) when ρA,E is not completely mixed.
Proof: For −1 < s < t, we choose σE such that H1+t(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = HG1+t(A|E|ρA,E). Since s 7→ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)
is monotonically decreasing (Lemma 5),
HG1+t(A|E|ρA,E) = H1+t(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (22)
≤HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)
for s < t. In particular, when ρA,E is not completely mixed, Inequality (22) is strict. Hence, the function is strictly decreasing
for s ∈ (−1,∞).
Given a state ρA,B,E on HA ⊗HB ⊗HE , Lemma 7 yields that
e−sH
G
1+s(A|B,E|ρA,B,E) ≤ min
σE
e−sH1+s(A|B,E|ρA,B,E‖ρmix,B⊗σE)
=dsB minσE
e−sH1+s(A,B|E|ρA,B,E‖σE) = dsBe
−sHG1+s(A,B|E|ρA,B,E). (23)
That is, t = s1+s ∈ (0, 1) satisfies that
− tHG1
1−t
(A|B,E|ρA,B,E) = − s
1 + s
HG1+s(A|B,E|ρA,B,E)
≤ s
1 + s
log dB − s
1 + s
HG1+s(A,B|E|ρA,B,E) = t log dB − tHG1
1−t
(A,B|E|ρA,B,E). (24)
Using the Lemma 7, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 9: Given a c-q sub state ρA,E =
∑
a PA(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a, any TP-CP map Λ on HE satisfies that
HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) ≤ HG1+s(A|E|Λ(ρA,E))
for 1 ≥ s ≥ 0.
Proof: Due to (15) and Lemma 7, we obtain
sHG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = maxσE sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤max
σE
sH1+s(A|E|Λ(ρA,E)‖Λ(σE)) ≤ max
σE
sH1+s(A|E|Λ(ρA,E)‖σE) = sHG1+s(A|E|Λ(ρA,E)).
8C. Criteria for secret random numbers
1) Case of joint sub-state: Next, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from the secret random
number A to E for joint sub-state ρA,E . Using the trace norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state ρA,E as follows:
d1(A|E|ρA,E) := ‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1. (25)
Taking into account the randomness, Renner [22] defined the following criteria for security of a secret random number:
d′1(A|E|ρA,E) := ‖ρA,E − ρmix,A ⊗ ρE‖1. (26)
It is known that the quantity is universally composable [38]. We call it the L1 distinguishability criterion.
Renner[22] defined the conditional L2-distance from uniform of ρA,E relative to a normalized state σE on HE :
d2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := Tr ((I ⊗ σ−1/4E )(ρA,E − ρmix,A ⊗ ρE)(I ⊗ σ−1/4E ))2
=Tr ((I ⊗ σ−1/4E )ρA,E(I ⊗ σ−1/4E ))2 −
1
|A|Tr (σ
−1/4
E ρEσ
−1/4
E )
2 = e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) − 1|A|e
ψ(1|ρE‖σE). (27)
Using this value, we can evaluate d′1(A|E|ρA,E) as follows [22, Lemma 5.2.3]
d′1(A|E|ρA,E) ≤
√
|A|
√
d2(A|E|ρA,E |σE). (28)
2) Case of joint normalized state: In the remaining part of this subsection, we assume that the state ρA,E is a normalized
state. The correlation between the classical system A and the quantum system HE can be evaluated by the mutual information
I(A : E|ρ) := D(ρ‖ρA ⊗ ρE). (29)
This quantity has been adopted by many literatures [34], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65],
[67], [68], [7], [6], [69], [70] as a criteria of independence. In order to take account into uniformity as well as independence,
we modify the mutual information by using the completely mixed state ρmix,A on A:
I ′(A|E|ρA,E) := D(ρA,E‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE), (30)
which is called the modified mutual information and satisfies
I ′(A|E|ρA,E) = I(A : E|ρA,E) +D(ρA‖ρmix,A) (31)
and
H(A|E|ρA,E) = −I ′(A|E|ρA,E) + log |A|. (32)
This quantity I(A : E|ρA,E) represents the amount of information leaked by E, and the remaining quantity D(ρA‖ρmix,A)
describes the difference of the random number A from the uniform random number. So, if the quantity I ′(A|E|ρA,E) is small,
we can conclude that the random number A has less correlation with E and is close to the uniform random number. In particular,
if the quantity I ′(A|E|ρA,E) goes to zero, the mutual information I(A : E|ρA,E) goes to zero, and the marginal distribution
ρA goes to the uniform distribution. In this paper, we can adopt the quantity I ′(A|E|ρA,E) as a criterion for qualifying the
secret random number. The detail validity of the quantity I ′(A|E|ρA,E) is given in Appendix A.
Using the quantum version of Pinsker inequality, we obtain
d1(A|E|ρA,E)2 ≤ 2I(A|E|ρA,E) (33)
d′1(A|E|ρA,E)2 ≤ 2I ′(A|E|ρA,E). (34)
Conversely, we can evaluate I(A : E|ρA,E) and I ′(A|E|ρA,E) by using d1(A|E|ρA,E) and d′1(A|E|ρA,E) in the following
way. When ρA,E is a normalized c-q state, applying the Fannes inequality, we obtain
0 ≤I(A : E|ρA,E) = H(A|ρA,E) +H(E|ρA,E)−H(A,E|ρA,E) = H(A,E|ρA ⊗ ρE)−H(A,E|ρA,E)
=
∑
a
PA(a)H(E|ρE)−H(E|PρE|a)
≤
∑
a
PA(a)η(‖ρE|a − ρE‖1, log dE) = η(‖ρA,E − ρA ⊗ ρE‖1, log dE) = η(d1(A|E|ρA,E), log dE) (35)
where dE is the dimension of HE . Similarly, we obtain
0 ≤I ′(A|E|ρA,E) = H(A|ρmix,A) +H(E|ρA,E)−H(A,E|ρA,E) = H(A,E|ρmix,A ⊗ ρE)−H(A,E|ρA,E)
≤η(‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE − ρA,E‖1, log |A|dE) = η(d′1(A|E|ρA,E), log |A|dE). (36)
9III. ENSEMBLE OF HASH FUNCTIONS
A. Ensemble of general hash functions
In this section, we focus on an ensemble {fX} of hash functions fX from A to B, where X is a random variable identifying
the function fX. In this case, the total information of Eve’s system is written as the composite system of HE and X. By using
the state ρfX(A),E,X :=
∑
a∈f−1
X
(b),x PX(x)PA(a)|b〉〈b| ⊗ ρE|a ⊗ |x〉〈x|, the L1 distinguishability criterion is written as
d′1(fX(A)|E,X|ρfX(A),E,X) = ‖ρfX(A),E,X − ρmix,B ⊗ ρE,X‖1
=
∑
x
PX(x)‖ρfX=x(A),E − ρmix,B ⊗ ρE‖1 = EX‖PfX(A),E − ρmix,B ⊗ ρE‖1. (37)
Then, the modified mutual information is written as
I ′(fX(A)|E,X|ρfX(A),E,X) = D(ρfX(A),E,X‖ρmix,B ⊗ ρE,X)
=
∑
x
PX(x)D(ρfX=x(A),E‖ρmix,B ⊗ ρE) = EXD(ρfX(A),E‖ρmix,B ⊗ ρE). (38)
We say that a function ensemble {fX} is ε-almost universal2 [1], [2], [19], if, for any pair of different inputs a1,a2, the
collision probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
Pr [fX(a1) = fX(a2)] ≤ ε|B| . (39)
The parameter ε appearing in (39) is shown to be confined in the region
ε ≥ |A| − |B||A| − 1 , (40)
and in particular, an ensemble {fX} with ε = 1 is simply called a universal2 function ensemble.
Two important examples of universal2 hash function ensembles are the Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [3]), and multiplications
over a finite field (see, e.g., [1], [4]). A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal2, which is
given by a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I [18]. The (modified) Toeplitz matrices
are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform
algorithm with complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [5]).
The following proposition holds for any universal2 function ensemble.
Proposition 10 (Renner [22, Lemma 5.4.3]): Given any composite c-q sub-state ρA,E on HA ⊗ HE and any normalized
state σE on HE , any universal2 ensemble of hash functions fX from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (41)
More precisely, the inequality
EXe
−H2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ (1− 1
M
)e−H2(A|E|ρE‖σE) +
1
M
eψ(1|ρA,E‖σE) (42)
holds.
B. Ensemble of linear hash functions
Tsurumaru and Hayashi[19] focus on linear functions over the finite field F2. Now, we treat the case of linear functions over
a finite field Fq, where q is a power of a prime number p. That is, the following contents are generalization of the arguments
given in [19]. Further, the contents withe respect to the modified mutual information are not given in [19] even with q = 2. We
assume that sets A, B are Fnq , Fmq respectively with n ≥ m, and f are linear functions over Fq. Note that, in this case, there is
a kernel C corresponding to a given linear function f , which is a vector space of the dimension n−m or more. Conversely,
when given a vector subspace C ⊂ Fnq of the dimension n−m or more, we can always construct a linear function
fC : F
n
q → Fnq /C ∼= Flq, l ≤ m. (43)
That is, we can always identify a linear hash function fC and a code C.
When CX = Ker fX, the definition of ε-universal2 function ensemble of (39) takes the form
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [fX(x) = 0] ≤ q−mε, (44)
which is equivalent with
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ CX] ≤ q−mε. (45)
This shows that the ensemble of kernel {CX} contains sufficient information for determining if a function ensemble {fX} is
ε-almost universal2 or not.
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For a given ensemble of codes {CX}, we define its minimum (respectively, maximum) dimension as tmin := minX dimCX
(respectively, tmax := maxX dimCX). Then, we say that a linear code ensemble {CX} of minimum (or maximum) dimension
t is an ε-almost universal2 code ensemble, if the following condition is satisfied
∀x ∈ Fnq \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ CX] ≤ qt−nε. (46)
In particular, if ε = 1, we call {CX} a universal2 code ensemble.
C. Dual universality of a code ensemble
Based on Tsurumaru and Hayashi[19], we define several variations of the universality of an ensemble of error-correcting
codes and the linear functions as follows. First, we define the dual code ensemble {CX}⊥ of a given linear code ensemble
{CX} as the set of all dual codes of CX. That is, {CX}⊥ = {C⊥X}. We also introduce the notion of dual universality as
follows. We say that a code ensemble {CX} in Fnq is ε-almost dual universal2 with minimum dimension t (with maximum
dimension t), if the dual ensemble C⊥ is ε-almost universal2 with maximum dimension n− t (with minimum dimension n− t).
Hence, We say that a linear function ensemble {fX} from Fnq to Fmq is ε-almost dual universal2, if the kernels CX of fX forms
an ε-almost dual universal2 code ensemble with minimum dimension n−m. This condition is equivalent with the condition
that the ensemble of the linear spaces spanned by the generating matrix of fX forms an ε-almost universal2 code ensemble
with maximum dimension m. An explicit example of a dual universal2 function ensemble (with ε = 1) can be given by the
modified Toeplitz matrices mentioned earlier [16], i.e., a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix
I . This example is particularly useful in practice because it is both universal2 and dual universal2, and also because there exists
an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n).
With these preliminaries, we can present the following theorem as Fq extension of [19, Corollary 2]:
Proposition 11: An ε-almost universal2 surjective liner hash function ensemble {fX} from Fnq to Fmq is q(1− qmε) + (ε−
1)qn−m-almost dual universal2 liner hash function ensemble.
As a special case, we obtain the following.
Corollary 12: Any universal2 linear function ensemble {fX} over a finite filed Fq is q-almost dual universal2 function
ensemble.
D. Permuted code ensemble
In order to treat an example of ε-almost universal2 functions, we consider the case when the distribution is invariant under
permutations of the order in Fnq = An. Now, Sn denotes the symmetric group of degree n, and σ(i) = j means that σ ∈ Sn
maps i to j, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The code σ(C) is defined by {xσ := (xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n))|x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C}. Then,
we introduce the permuted code ensemble {σ(C)}σ∈Sn of a code C. In this ensemble, σ obeys the uniform distribution on
Sn
For an element x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq , we can define the empirical distribution px on Fq as px(a) := #{i|xi = a}/n.
So, we denote the set of the empirical distributions on Fnq = An by Tn,A. The cardinality |Tn,A| is bounded by (n+ 1)q−1.
Similarly, we define T+n,A := Tn,A \ {10}, where 10 is the deterministic distribution on 0 ∈ Fq . For given a code C ⊂ Fnq , we
define εp(C) := q
n#{x∈C|px=p}
|C|#{x∈Fnq |px=p}
and ε(C) := maxp∈T+n,A εp(C). Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 13: The permuted code ensemble {σ(C)}σ∈Sn of a code C is ε(C)-almost universal2.
Proof: For any non-zero element x′ ∈ Fnq , we fix an empirical distribution p := px′ . Then, x′ belongs to σ(C) with the
probability #{x∈C|px=p}#{x∈Fnq |px=p} . That is, the probability that x
′ belongs to σ(C) is less than ε(C)|C|qn .
Lemma 14: For any t ≤ n, there exists a t-dimensional code C ∈ Fnq such that
ε(C) < (n+ 1)q−1. (47)
Proof: Let {CX}X be a universal2 code ensemble. Then, any p ∈ T+n,A satisfies EXεp(CX) ≤ 1. The Markov inequality
yields
Pr{εp(CX) ≥ |Tn,A|} ≤ 1|Tn,A| (48)
and thus
Pr{∃p ∈ T+n,A, εp(CX) ≥ |Tn,A|} ≤
|Tn,A| − 1
|Tn,A| . (49)
Hence,
Pr{∀p ∈ T+n,A, εp(CX) < |Tn,A|} ≥
1
|Tn,A| . (50)
Therefore, there exists a code C satisfying the desired condition (47).
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E. δ-biased ensemble
Next, according to Dodis and Smith[12], we introduce δ-biased ensemble of random variables {WX}. For a given δ > 0,
an ensemble of random variables {WX} on Fnq is called δ-biased when the inequality
EX(EWX(−1)x·WX)2 ≤ δ2 (51)
holds for any x ∈ Fnq .
We denote the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a code C ∈ Fnq , by WC . Then,
EWC (−1)x·WC =
{
0 if x /∈ C⊥
1 if x ∈ C⊥. (52)
Using the above relation, as is suggested in [12, Case 2], we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 15: When a code ensemble {CX} in Fnq is ε-almost dual universal with minimum dimension t, the ensemble of
random variables {WCX} in Fnq is
√
εq−t-biased.
Proof: {C⊥
X
} is ε-almost universal with maximum dimension n − t in Fnq . Hence, for any x ∈ Fnq , the probability
Pr{x ∈ C⊥
X
} is less than εq−t. Thus, (52) guarantees that the ensemble of random variables {WCX} in Fnq is
√
εq−t-biased.
In the following, we treat the case of A = Fnq . Given a composite state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE and a distribution PW on A, as
a quantum generalization of PA,E ∗PW , we define another composite state ρA,E ∗PW :=
∑
w PW (w)
∑
a PA(a)|a+w〉〈a+
w|⊗ρEa . Then, using this concept, Fehr and Schaffner [13] obtain the following proposition as a quantum extension of Lemma
4 of Dodis and Smith[12]. Their proof is based on discrete Fourier transform and is easy to understand.
Proposition 16 ([13, Theorem 3.2]): For any c-q sub-state ρA,E on HA ⊗ HE and any normalized state σE on HE , a
δ-biased ensemble of random variables {WX} on A = Fnq satisfies
EXd2(A|E|ρA,E ∗ PWX‖σE) ≤ δ2e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (53)
More precisely,
EXd2(A|E|ρA,E ∗ PWX‖σE) ≤ δ2(1 −
1
qn
)e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (54)
Using the above proposition, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 17: Given a c-q sub-state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE and a normalized state σE on HE . When {CX} is an ε-almost dual
universal2 code ensemble with minimum dimension t, the ensemble of hash functions {fCX} satisfies
EXd2(fCX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ εe−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (55)
More precisely,
EXe
−H2(fCX (A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ ε(1− 1
qn
)e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) +
1
qn−t
eψ(1|ρA,E‖σE). (56)
In other words, an ε-almost dual universal2 function family {fX} from Fnq to Fn−tq satisfies (55) and (56).
Proof: Due to Lemma 15 and (53), we obtain
EXd2(A|E|ρA,E ∗ PWCX ‖σE) ≤ εq−te−H2(A|E|ρ‖σE). (57)
Now, we focus on the relation A ∼= A/C × C ∼= fC × C for any code C. Then, we obtain
ρ˜(WC) =
∑
w∈C
q−t
∑
a
PA(a)|a+ w〉〈a+ w| ⊗ ρEa =
∑
w∈C
q−t|w〉〈w| ⊗
∑
[a]∈A/C
PA([a])|[a]〉〈[a]| ⊗ ρE[a]
=
∑
w∈C
q−t|w〉〈w| ⊗ ρfC(A),E.
Thus, (57) implies
d2(A|E|ρA,E ∗ PWC ‖σE) = q−td2(fC(A)|E|ρfC (A),E‖σE) = q−td2(fC(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE). (58)
Therefore,
EXq
−td2(fCX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ εq−te−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE),
which implies (55).
Similarly, Lemma 15, (54), and (58) imply that
EXq
−td2(fCX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤ εq−t(1−
1
qn
)e−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE).
Since EXd2(fCX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) = EXe−H2(fCX (A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) − 1qn−t eψ(1|ρE‖σE), we have (56).
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IV. SECURITY BOUNDS WITH RE´NYI ENTROPY OF ORDER 2
Next, we consider the quantum case for the security bound based on the Re´nyi entropy of order 2. Renner[22, Lemma 5.2.3]
essentially evaluated EXd′1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) by using EXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) as follows.
Lemma 18: Given a composite c-q sub-state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE and a normalized state σE on HE , any ensemble of hash
functions fX from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ M
1
2
√
EXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
Further, the inequalities used in proof of Renner[22, Corollary 5.6.1] imply that
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ 2‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1 + EXd′1(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E)
≤2‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1 +M
1
2
√
EXd2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖σE).
Applying the same discussion to the von Neumann entropy, we can evaluate the average of the modified mutual information
criterion by using EXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) as follows.
Lemma 19: Assume that ρA,E is a normalized composite c-q state ρA,E on HA⊗HE . Any ensemble of hash functions fX
from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E)) (59)
≤MEXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E). (60)
Further, when a composite c-q sub-state ρ′A,E satisfies ρ′E ≤ ρE and ρ′A ≤ ρA,
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE)), (61)
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE), (62)
where M˜ := max{M, dE}.
Proof: The inequality ψ(1|ρ′E‖ρE) ≤ 0 holds because ρ′E ≤ ρE . Since
d2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) = e−H2(fX(A)|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) − 1
M
eψ(1|ρ
′
E‖ρE) ≥ e−H2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) − 1
M
, (63)
we have
e−H2(fX(A)|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) ≤d2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) +
1
M
.
Taking the logarithm, we obtain
− logM+ log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE)) ≥ −H2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) ≥ −H(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE). (64)
Substituting ρA,E to ρ′A,E , we obtain H(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖ρE) = H(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) and
I ′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) = logM−H(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E)).
Since the function x 7→ log(1 + x) is concave, we obtain
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ log(1 +MEXd2(fX(A)|E|ρA,E)),
which implies (59). The inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x yields (60).
Fannes inequality guarantees that
|Tr (ρE − ρ′E) log ρE | ≤ η(‖ρE − ρ′E‖1}, log dE) ≤ η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜),
and
|H(E|fX(A)|ρA,E‖ρA)−H(E|fX(A)|ρ′A,E‖ρA)| = |
∑
b
PfX(A)(b)H(E|ρE|fX(A)=b)−H(E|ρ′E|fX(A)=b)|
≤
∑
b
PfX(A)(b) log dE‖ρE|fX(A)=b − ρ′E|fX(A)=b‖1 = log dE‖ρfX(A),E − ρ′fX(A),E‖1
≤η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log dE) ≤ η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜).
Since the condition ρ′A ≤ ρA implies −Tr (ρfX(A) − ρ′fX(A)) log ρfX(A) ≥ 0, we have
H(fX(A)|E|ρA,E‖ρE)−H(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) = H(fX(A), E|ρA,E) + Tr ρE log ρE −H(fX(A), E|ρ′A,E)− Tr ρ′E log ρE
=H(E|fX(A)|ρA,E‖ρA)−H(E|fX(A)|ρ′A,E‖ρA)− Tr (ρfX(A) − ρ′fX(A)) log ρfX(A) +Tr (ρE − ρ′E) log ρE
≥H(E|fX(A)|ρA,E‖ρA)−H(E|fX(A)|ρ′A,E‖ρA) + Tr (ρE − ρ′E) log ρE ≥ −2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜). (65)
13
Therefore, (65) and (64) imply that
I ′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) = logM−H(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ 2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + logM−H(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE)
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + log(1 +Md2(fX(A)|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE)).
Therefore, taking the expectation of X, we obtain (61), which implies (62).
In this proof, the condition ρ′E ≤ ρE is crucial because Inequality (63) cannot be shown without this condition.
Now, we evaluate the security by combining Proposition 10 and Lemmas 18 and 19. For this purpose, we introduce the
quantities
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) := min
σE
min
ρ′A,E
2‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖σE)
= min
σE
min
ǫ1>0
2ǫ1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E‖σE),
∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E) := min
σE
min
ρ′A,E :ρ
′
E≤σE ,
η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + εMe−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE)
= min
ǫ1>0
η(ǫ1, log M˜) + εMe
−H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E‖ρE),
where M˜ := max{M, dE} and
H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := max
ρ′A,E :‖ρA,E−ρ
′
A,E‖1≤ǫ1
H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE) (66)
H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E) := max
ρ′A,E :‖ρA,E−ρ
′
A,E‖1≤ǫ1,ρ
′
E≤ρE ,ρ
′
A≤ρA
H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE). (67)
Note that Hǫ12 (A|E|ρA,E) is different from H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E‖ρE) because the definition of H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E) has additional
constraints for ρ′A,E . Then, we obtain the following lemma under the universal2 condition.
Lemma 20: Given a normalized state σE on HE and c-q sub-states ρA,E , any universal2 ensemble of hash functions fX
from A to {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤M
1
2 e−
1
2H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤∆d,2(M, 1|ρA,E) (68)
When ρA,E is a normalized c-q state, it satisfies
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤Me−H2(A|E|ρA,E)
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤∆I,2(M, 1|ρA,E), (69)
While the above evaluations of the L1 distinguishability criterion has been shown in Renner[22, Corollary 5.6.1], those of
the modified mutual information criterion have not been shown until now.
Further, since H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE), Renner[22] introduced the idea to replace H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE)
by the min entropy Hmin(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE) in (68). For this purpose, based on Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE), Renner[22] introduced
ǫ1-smooth min entropy as
Hǫ1min(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := max
‖ρA,E−ρ′A,E‖1≤ǫ1
Hmin(A|E|ρ′A,E‖σE). (70)
Then, Renner[22, Corollary 5.6.1] obtained another upper bound:
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ ∆d,min(M, ε|ρA,E), (71)
where
∆d,min(M, ε|ρA,E) := min
σE
min
ǫ1>0
2ǫ1 +
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H
ǫ1
2 (A|E|ρA,E‖σE).
That is, he proposed to evaluate ∆d,min(M, 1|ρA,E) instead of ∆d,2(M, 1|ρA,E). However, the bound ∆d,2(M, 1|ρA,E) gives
a strictly better bound in the following sense.
When there is no side information, i.e., the state is given as a distribution PA on A, the previous paper [17] showed that
−1
n
log∆d,min(e
nR, 1|PnA) <
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, 1|PnA).
Further, when the side information is classical, i.e., the state is given as a joint distribution PA,E on the joint system, the paper
[71] showed that
−1
n
log∆d,min(e
nR, 1|PnA,E) <
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, 1|PnA,E).
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That is, in these cases, ∆d,2(enR, 1|ρ⊗nA,E) gives a strictly better exponential decreasing rate. Hence, we focus on the bounds
based on Re´nyi entropy of order 2 rather than those based on min entropy.
Since the function x 7→ η(x, y) is concave, combing Inequality (36), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 21: Any universal2 ensemble of hash functions fX from A to {1, . . . ,M} and any normalized c-q state ρA,E on
HA ⊗HE satisfy
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ η(∆d,2(M, 1|ρA,E), log |A|dE). (72)
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Since the function x 7→ √x is concave, combing Inequality (34), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 22: Any universal2 ensemble of hash functions fX from A to {1, . . . ,M} and any normalized c-q state ρA,E on
HA ⊗HE satisfy
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ 2
√
∆I,2(M, 1|ρA,E) (73)
for s ∈ (0, 1].
Similarly, combining Lemmas 17, 18, and 19, under the ε-almost dual universal2 condition and employing the same discussion
as Corollaries 21 and 22, we can evaluate the average of both security criteria as follows.
Lemma 23: Given a normalized state σE on HE and c-q sub-states ρA,E on HA ⊗HE . When an ensemble of linear hash
functions {fX}X from A to {1, . . . ,M} is ε-almost dual universal2, we obtain
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤
√
εM
1
2 e−
1
2H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE),
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E). (74)
When ρA,E is a normalized c-q state, we have
EXd
′
1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤2
√
∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E), (75)
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤εMe−H2(A|E|ρA,E),
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E), (76)
EXI
′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤η(∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E), log |A|dE). (77)
Hence, the quantities EXd′1(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) and EXI ′(fX(A)|E|ρA,E) can be evaluated by bounding the quantities ∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E)
and ∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E). In the next section, we derive upper bounds of these quantities.
V. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: SINGLE-SHOT CASE
In this section. in order to evaluate the security of secret key generation with no error in the single-shot case, we evaluate
the upper bounds ∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E), and ∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E).
A. L1 distinguishability criterion
In order to describe our upper bound of ∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E), we introduce two notations. We denote the number of eigenvalues
by v(σE), and define the real number λ(σE) := log a1 − log a0 by using the maximum eigenvalue a1 and the minimum
eigenvalue a0 of σE . Then, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 24: Given any c-q sub-state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE and any normalized state σE on HE , we have
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤(4 +
√
εv(σE))M
s/2e−
s
2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (78)
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤(4 +
√
ε⌈λ(σE)⌉)Ms/2e− s2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)+ s2 (79)
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Further, when ρA,E is normalized,
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤(4 +√εvs)Ms/2e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E) (80)
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤(4 +
√
ε⌈λs⌉)Ms/2e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E)+
s
2 (81)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where vs := v(TrAρ1+sA,E/Tr ρ1+sA,E) and λs := λ(TrAρ1+sA,E/Tr ρ1+sA,E).
Indeed, the number v(σE) in crease at most polynomially when σE is i.i.d. However, otherwise, it does not generally behaves
polynomially with respect to the system size when the system size increases. On the other hand, the number λ(σE) is decided
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only by the ratio between the maximum and the minimum eigenvalues. In many cases, we can expect that the number λ(σE)
behaves linearly with respect to the system size when the system size increases.
Proof of Theorem 24: When ρ′A,E = PρA,EP with a projection P , we have ‖ρ′A,E − ρA,E‖1 ≤ 2
√
Tr ρA,E(I − P ). Any
projection P satisfies
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤4
√
Tr ρA,E(I − P ) +M1/2e− 12H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖σE). (82)
We choose P = {EσE (ρA,E)− 1MI ⊗ σE ≤ 0}, where we simplify EIA⊗σE to EσE . Since P is commutative with I ⊗ σE ,
Tr ρA,E(I − P ) = Tr ρA,EEσE (I − P ) = Tr EσE (ρA,E)(I − P ) ≤ Tr EσE (ρA,E)1+sMs(I ⊗ σ−sE )(I − P )
≤Tr EσE (ρA,E)1+sMs(I ⊗ σ−sE ) = Mse−sH1+s(A|E|EσE (ρA,E)‖σE). (83)
Further, using (7), we have
e−H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖σE) = TrPρA,EPσ
−1/2
E PρA,EPσ
−1/2
E
≤vTrPEσE (ρA,E)Pσ−1/2E PρA,EPσ−1/2E = ve−H2(A|E|PEσE (ρA,E)P‖σE).
Thus,
Me−H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖σE) ≤ vMe−H2(A|E|PEσE (ρA,E)P‖σE) = vTr EσE (ρA,E)2M(I ⊗ σ−1E )P
≤vTr EσE (ρA,E)1+sMs(I ⊗ σ−sE )P ≤ vTr EσE (ρA,E)1+sMs(I ⊗ σ−sE ) = vMse−sH1+s(A|E|EσE (ρA,E)‖σE). (84)
Substituting (83) and (84) into RHS of (82), we obtain
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤ (4 +
√
εv)Ms/2e−
s
2H1+s(A|E|EσE (ρA,E)‖σE) ≤ (4 +√εv)Ms/2e− s2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE).
Hence, we obtain (78).
Next, we show (79). For this purpose, we choose a positive integer l. For the given λ = λ(σE), we define σ′E by the
following procedure. First, we diagonalize σE as σE =
∑
y sy|uy〉〈uy|. We define s′y := a0eλi when log sy ∈ (log a0 + λl (i−
1), log a0 +
λ
l i] for i = 1, . . . , l. We define s
′
y := a0e
λ when sy = a0. Hence, σE ≤ σ′E ≤ e
λ
l σE and 1 ≤ Trσ′E ≤ e
λ
l
. Then,
e−
λ
l σE ≤ σ
′
E
Trσ′E
. Since e
− s2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖
σ′E
Trσ′
E
) ≤ e− s2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖e−
λ
l σE)
, Inequality (78) implies that
∆d,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤ (4 +
√
εl)Ms/2e
− s2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖
σ′E
Trσ′
E
)
≤(4 +
√
εl)Ms/2e−
s
2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖e
− λ
l σE) = (4 +
√
εl)e
sλ
2l M
s/2e−
s
2H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE).
Substituting ⌈λ⌉ into l, we obtain (79).
Applying Lemma 7, we obtain (80) from (78) with σE = TrAρ
1+s
A,E
TrAEρ
1+s
A,E
. Similarly, (78) yields (81). Therefore, we obtain
Theorem 24.
Remark 1: In our proof of the above theorems, the state ρ′A,E is chosen by the information-spectrum-smoothing of the
pinched state EσE (ρA,E). Since the choice in [27] is also characterized by the the information-spectrum-smoothing of the
pinched state, our choice is the same as the choice in [27].
B. Modified mutual information
The bound ∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E) can be evaluated by using the conditional Re´nyi entropy H1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) as follows.
Theorem 25:
∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤2η(2M s2−s e− s2−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E)), vε/4 + log M˜) (85)
≤2η(2M s2−s e− s2−sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E), vε/4 + log M˜) (86)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where M˜ := max{M, dE} and v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE .
Proof of Theorem 25: When ρ′A,E = PρA,EP with a projection P , ‖ρ′A,E−ρA,E‖1 ≤ 2
√
Tr ρA,E(I − P ). Any projection
P satisfies
∆I,2(M, ε|ρA,E) ≤2η(2
√
Tr ρA,E(I − P ), log M˜) + εMe−H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖ρE). (87)
We choose P = {EρE (ρA,E) − 1M′ I ⊗ ρE ≤ 0} with arbitrary real number M′. Since P is commutative with IA ⊗ ρE and
ρA ⊗ IE , the sub-state ρ′A,E = PρA,EP satisfies ρ′E ≤ ρE and ρ′A ≤ ρA. Hence, we can apply Lemmas 19 and 23.
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Further, since P is commutative with IA ⊗ ρE , similar to (83) and (84), we obtain
Tr ρA,E(I − P ) = Tr EρE (ρA,E)(I − P ) ≤ M′se−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E)) (88)
and
Me−H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖ρE) ≤vMM′s−1e−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E)). (89)
We choose M′ := e−
s
2−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E))M
2
2−s
. Then, we obtain
Tr ρA,E(I − P ) ≤ M 2s2−s e− 2s2−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E)) (90)
and
Me−H2(A|E|PρA,EP‖ρE) ≤ vM s2−s e− s2−sH1+s(A|E|EρE (ρA,E)). (91)
Substituting (90) and (91) to (87), we obtain (85). Then, (86) follows from (15). Therefore, we obtain Theorem 25.
VI. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: ASYMPTOTIC CASE
A. Approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2
Next, we consider the quantum case when our state is given by the n-fold independent and identical state ρA,E , i.e., ρ⊗nA,E .
In this case, we focus on the optimal generation rate
G(ρA,E) := sup
{(fn,Mn)}
{
lim
n→∞
logMn
n
∣∣∣∣ d′1(fn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) → 0
}
.
Due to Theorem 24, when the generation rate R = limn→∞ logMnn is smaller than H(A|E), there exists a sequence of functions
fn : A → {1, . . . , enR} such that
d′1(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤ (4 +
√
vn)e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A|E|ρ
⊗n
A,E)+
nsR
2 = (4 +
√
vn)e
n(−s2 H
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E)+
sR
2 ), (92)
where vn is the number of eigenvalues of (TrAρ1+sA,E)⊗n, which is a polynomial increasing for n. Since lims→0 −12 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) =
H(A|E|ρA,E), there exists a number s ∈ (0, 1] such that s2HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)− sR2 > 0. Thus, the right hand side of (92) goes
to zero exponentially. Conversely, due to (16), any sequence of functions fn : An 7→ {1, . . . , enR} satisfies that
lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E)
n
≤ H(A|E|ρ
⊗n
A,E)
n
= H(A|E|ρA,E). (93)
Therefore,
lim
n→∞
I ′(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E)
n
= R− lim
n→∞
H(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E)
n
≥ R−H(A|E|ρA,E). (94)
That is, when R > H(A|E|ρA,E), I
′(fn(A)|E|ρ
⊗n
A,E)
n does not go to zero. Due to (34), d′1(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E) does not go to zero.
Hence, we can recover the result by [45] as
G(ρA,E) = H(A|E|ρA,E). (95)
In order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the exponentially decreasing rate (exponent) of d′1(fn(A)|E|ρ⊗nA,E)
for a given R. As another criterion, we also focus on a variant I ′(fn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) = I(fn(An) : En|ρ⊗nA,E)+D(ρfn(An)‖ρmix,fn(An))
of the mutual information.
For this purpose, we evaluate the exponential deceasing rates of upper bounds. For a given polynomial P (n), Theorems 24
and 25 yield that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, P (n)|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E |R), (96)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log∆I,2(e
nR, P (n)|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R), (97)
where
eG,q(ρA,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
s
2
HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−
s
2
R = max
0≤t≤ 12
t
2(1− t) (H
G
1
1−t
(A|E|ρA,E)−R),
eH,q(ρA,E |R) := max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s (H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−R).
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When the side information is classical, i.e., the state is given as a joint distribution PA,E on the joint system, the equation
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, ε|PnA,E) = max
0≤s≤1/2
t(HG1
1−t
(A|E|PA,E)−R) (98)
is shown by combination of [71] and the forthcoming paper [53]1. Hence, our evaluation (96) is not tight in general. However,
Equality in (96) holds in a special case given in Subsection VIII-B as Lemma 36. Since the example given in Subsection
VIII-B is very natural in the quantum case, our evaluation is useful in the quantum setting.
Applying Lemma 20, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 26: When a function ensemble fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} is universal2,
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E |R), (99)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnI
′(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R). (100)
Similarly, using Lemma 23, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 27: When an ensemble of linear functions fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} is P (n)-almost dual universal2, we
have
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E |R), (101)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnI
′(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R). (102)
In particular, when codes Cn satisfies condition (47), we have
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log d′1(fCn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E |R) (103)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I ′(fCn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eH,q(ρA,E |R). (104)
B. Comparison for exponents
Now, we compare exponents given in Theorem 26 with exponents derived by Corollaries 21 and 22. When a function
ensemble fXn from An to {1, . . . , ⌊enR⌋} is universal2, Corollary 22 yields the inequality
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥
1
2
eH,q(ρA,E |R). (105)
Similarly, Corollary 21 yields the inequality
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnI
′(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E |R), (106)
under the same condition for a function ensemble fXn .
In order to compare (105) and (106) with (99) and (100), respectively, we prepare the following lemma for two exponents
eH,q(ρA,E |R) and eG,q(ρA,E |R).
Lemma 28: We obtain
1
2
eH,q(ρA,E |R) ≤ eG,q(ρA,E |R). (107)
Further, when the relations
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = HG1
1−s
(A|E|ρA,E) (108)
and
R ≥ R(2/3) := (2 − s)
2
2
d
ds
s
2− sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E)
∣∣∣∣
s= 23
(109)
hold, we obtain a stronger inequality
eH,q(ρA,E |R) ≤ eG,q(ρA,E |R). (110)
Hence, we can conclude that (99) is better than (105). Similarly, under the condition in Lemma 28, (106) is better than
(100). However, the relation between (106) and (100) is not clear in general, now. The condition (108) seems too restrictive.
However a typical example given in Section VIII satisfies the condition. Hence, Lemma 28 is often useful.
1The part ≥ is shown in [71]. The part ≤ with ε = 1 is shown in [53]. The LHS is monotonically decreasing for ε. Hence, we have (98) with ε ≥ 1.
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Therefore, when the number n is sufficiently large, Inequalities (80) and (81) are better evaluations for the average
EXnd
′
1(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) of the L1 distinguishability criterion sthan Corollary 22. In this case, if (110) holds, Corollary
21 gives a better evaluation for the average of the modified mutual information criterion EXnI ′(fXn(An)|En|ρ⊗nA,E) than
Inequality (86).
Proof of Lemma 28: Lemma 7 yields that
1
2
eH,q(ρA,E |R) = max
0≤s≤1
1
2− s (
s
2
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)− s
2
R) ≤ max
0≤s≤1
1
2− s (
s
2
HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−
s
2
R)
≤ max
0≤s≤1
s
2
(HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−R) = eG,q(ρA,E |R), (111)
where Inequality (111) follows from the non-negativity of the RHS of (111) and the inequality 12−s ≤ 1.
Next, we show (110). Assume that the relations (109) and (108) hold. We choose µ(s) := sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E). Then, µ′(s) ≥ 0
and µ′′(s) ≤ 0. Defining R(s) := (2−s)22 dds µ(s)2−s = µ(s)2 + 2−s2 µ′(s), we have
d
ds
1
2− s (µ(s)− sR) =
d
ds
(
µ(s)
2− s )−
2
(2− s)2R =
d
ds
(
µ(s)
2− s )−
2
(2− s)2R(s) + (R(s)−R)
2
(2− s)2 =
2(R(s)−R)
(2− s)2 .
Since ddsR(s) =
2−s
2 µ
′′(s) ≤ 0, the maximum maxs 12−s (µ(s) − sR) can be attained only when R = R(s). Hence, when
(109) holds,
eH,q(ρA,E |R) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s(H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−R) = max0≤s≤2/3
s
2− s (H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−R).
Now, we choose t by t2−2t =
s
2−s . Then, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1/2 and t ≤ s when 0 ≤ s ≤ 2/3. Hence, H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) − R ≤
H1+t(A|E|ρA,E)−R, which implies that
max
0≤s≤2/3
s
2− s (H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)−R) ≤ max0≤t≤1/2
t
2− 2t(H1+t(A|E|ρA,E)−R).
Since the relation (108) holds,
max
0≤t≤1/2
t
2− 2t (H1+t(A|E|ρA,E)−R) = max0≤t≤1/2
t
2− 2t(H
G
1
1−t
(A|E|ρA,E)−R) = eG,q(ρA,E |R).
C. Non i.i.d. case
Finally, we consider our bounds when the state ρ(n)A,E is given as non i.i.d. state on the system (HA ⊗HE)⊗n.
In this case, the speeds of increase of v and vs are not polynomial with respect to the size n of the system, in general.
Hence, when n is sufficiently large, the factor v and vs are not negligible.
However, when the minimum eigenvalue of ρ(n)A,E is greater than cn with a constant c > 0, the minimum eigenvalue of
TrA(ρ
(n)
A,E)
1+s/Tr (ρ
(n)
A,E)
1+s is greater than c(1+s)n. Hence, λs increases linearly with respect to n. Thus, when the key
generation rate is R, the upper bound (81) for the L1 distinguishability criterion has the factor of the order O(
√
n) with
the term e
nsR
2 −
s
2H
G
1+s(A|E|ρ
(n)
A,E)+
s
2
. For the modified mutual information criterion, Theorem 25 cannot derive a good bound
because the factor v does not behave polynomially. Instead of Theorem 25, Corollary 21 gives a better upper bound, which has
the factor of the order O(n3/2) with the term e
nsR
2 −
s
2H
G
1+s(A|E|ρ
(n)
A,E)+
s
2
. Hence, Theorem 24 and Corollary 21 have a larger
applicability beyond the i.i.d. case.
VII. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH ERROR CORRECTION
A. Protocol
Next, we apply the above discussions to secret key generation with public communication. Alice is assumed to have an initial
random variable a ∈ A, which generates with the probability pa, and Bob and Eve are assumed to have their initial quantum
states ρB|a and ρE|a on their quantum systems HB and HE , respectively. The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common
random variable almost independent of Eve’s quantum state by using a public communication. The quality is evaluated by
three quantities: the size of the final common random variable, the probability of the disagreement of their final variables (error
probability), and the information leaked to Eve, which can be quantified by the L1 distinguishability criterion or the modified
mutual information criterion between Alice’s final variables and Eve’s state.
In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A is a vector space on a finite field Fq. Indeed, even if
the cardinality |A| is not a prime power, it become a prime power by adding elements with zero probability. Hence, we can
assume that the cardinality |A| is a prime power q without loss of generality. Then, the secret key agreement can be realized
19
by the following two steps: The first is the error correction, and the second is the privacy amplification. In the error correction,
Alice and Bob prepare a linear subspace C1 ⊂ A and the representatives a(x) of all cosets x ∈ A/C1. Alice sends the coset
information [A] ∈ A/C1 to Bob in stead of her random variable A ∈ A, and Bob obtain his estimate Aˆ of A ∈ A from
his quantum state on HB and [A] ∈ A/C1. Alice obtains her random variable A1 := A − a([A]) ∈ C1, and Bob obtains his
random variable Aˆ1 := Aˆ − a([B]) ∈ C1. In the privacy amplification, Alice and Bob prepare a common hash function f on
C1. Then, applying the hash function f to the their variables A1 and Aˆ1, they obtain their final random variables f(A1) and
f(Aˆ1).
Indeed, the above protocol depends on the choice of estimator that gives the estimate Aˆ from [A] ∈ A/C1 and his random
variable B ∈ B (or his quantum state on HB). In the remaining part of this section, we give the estimator depending on the
setting and discuss the performance of this protocol.
B. Error probability
In the following, we give the concrete form of the estimator and evaluate the error probability when Bob’s information is
quantum. In this case, we construct an estimator for Aˆ in the following way. For a given code C1 ⊂ A and a normalized c-q
state ρA,B =
∑
a PA(a)|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρB|a, our decoder is given as follows: First, we define the projection:
Pa := {PA(a)ρB|a − q
t
|A|ρB ≥ 0}, (112)
where t is the dimension of C1. When Bob receives the coset [A], he applies the POVM {P ′a}:
P ′a := Q
−1/2
[A] PaQ
−1/2
[A] , Q[A] :=
∑
a∈[A]
Pa.
Then, Bob chooses the outcome a as the estimate Aˆ.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the error probability. Using the operator inequality [14, Lemma 4.5], we obtain
I − P ′a ≤ 2(I − Pa) + 4
∑
a′∈C1+a\{a}
Pa′ . (113)
Thus, the error probability Pe[ρA,B, C1] is evaluated as follows.
Pe[ρA,B, C1] =
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a(I − P ′a) ≤ 2
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a(I − Pa) + 4
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a
∑
a′∈C1+a\{a}
Pa′ .
Now, we choose the code C1 from ε-almost universal2 code ensemble {CX} with the dimension t. Then, the average of the
error probability can be evaluated as
EXPe[ρA,B, CX] ≤ 2
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a(I − Pa) + 4EX
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a
∑
a′∈C1+a\{a}
Pa′
≤2
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a(I − Pa) + 4
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|aε
qt
|A|
∑
a′ 6=a
Pa′
≤2
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a(I − Pa) + 4ε q
t
|A|
∑
a
PA(a)Tr ρB|a
∑
a′
Pa′ = 2
∑
a
TrPA(a)ρB|a(I − Pa) + 4ε q
t
|A|
∑
a′
Tr ρBPa′
≤2
∑
a
Tr (PA(a)ρB|a)
1−sρsB(
qt
|A| )
s + 4ε
∑
a′
Tr (PA(a
′)ρB|a′)
1−sρsB(
qt
|A| )
s
=(2 + 4ε)
∑
a′
Tr (PA(a
′)ρB|a′)
1−sρsB(
qt
|A| )
s = (2 + 4ε)(
qt
|A| )
sesH1−s(A|B|ρA,B). (114)
C. Leaked information with fixed error correction
As is mentioned in the previous sections, we have two criteria for quality of secret random variables. Given a code C1 ⊂ A
and a hash function f , the first criterion is d′1(f(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E), and the second criterion is I ′(f(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E). Note
that the random variable A can be written by the pair of A1 and [A] given in Subsection VII-A.
Theorem 29: When {fX} is a universal2 ensemble of hash functions from A/C1 to {1, . . . ,M}, the relations
EXd
′
1(fX(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E) ≤(4 +
√
v′)(|A|/L)s/2e−s2 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E), (115)
EXI
′(fX(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E) ≤η((4 +
√
v′)(|A|/L)s/2e−s2 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E), log |A|dE) (116)
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hold for s ∈ (0, 1], where v′ is the number of eigenvalues of TrAρ1+sA,E , v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE , L is the amount
of sacrifice information |C1|/M, and M˜ := max{M, dE}.
Proof: The relations (80) and (24) guarantee that
EXd
′
1(fX(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E) ≤ (4 +
√
v′)Ms/2e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A1|[A],E|ρA,E) ≤ (4 +
√
v′)Ms/2(|A|/|C1|)s/2e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A1,[A]|E|ρA,E)
=(4 +
√
v′)(M|A|/|C1|)s/2e
−s
2 H
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = (4 +
√
v′)(|A|/L)s/2e−s2 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E)
for s ∈ (0, 1], which implies (115). A simple combination of (36) and (115) yields (116).
Similarly, Lemma 23, (80), and (24) yield the following theorem.
Theorem 30: When {fX} is an ε-almost dual universal2 ensemble of hash functions from A/C1 to {1, . . . ,M}, the relation
EXd
′
1(fX(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E) ≤(4 +
√
εv′)(|A|/L)s/2e−s2 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E), (117)
EXI
′(fX(A1)|[A], E|ρA,E) ≤η((4 +
√
εv′)(|A|/L)s/2e−s2 HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E), log |A|dE) (118)
holds for s ∈ (0, 1], where v′ is the number of eigenvalues of TrAρ1+sA,E , v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE , L is the amount
of sacrifice information |C1|/M, and M˜ := max{M, dE}.
Remark 2: Similar to (115) and (117), using (81), we can show formulas with the logarithmic ratio λ between the maximum
and minimum eigenvalues of TrAρ1+sA,E .
D. Leaked information with randomized error correction code
Next, we evaluate leaked information when the error correcting code C1 is chosen from an ε1-almost universal2 code
ensemble. In this case, the evaluation for the average of the modified mutual information criterion can be improved to the
following way.
Theorem 31: We choose the code C1 from an ε1-almost universal2 code ensemble {CX} with the dimension t. Assume that
{fY} is an ε2-almost dual universal2 ensemble of hash functions from A/CX to {1, . . . ,M}, the random variables X and Y
are independent of each other, and ε2 ≥ 2.
EX,YI
′(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E) ≤2η((2(
|A|M
qt
)
s
2−s e−
s
2−sH1+s(A|E|ρ
′
A,E), log M˜+
vε2
2ε1
) + log ε1. (119)
for s ∈ (0, 1], where v is the number of eigenvalues of ρE and M˜ := max{M, dE}. Similarly, when {fY} is universal2
ensemble of hash functions from A/CX to {1, . . . ,M},
EX,YI
′(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E) ≤2η((2(
|A|M
qt
)
s
2−s e−
s
2−sH1+s(A|E|ρ
′
A,E), log M˜+
v
4ε1
) + log ε1. (120)
Proof: We choose a sub cq-state ρ′A,E =
∑
a |a〉〈a| ⊗ ρ′E|a such that ρ′E ≤ ρE and ρ′A ≤ ρA. Due to (56), we obtain
EYe
−H2(fY(A1)|[A]CX ,E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX
⊗ρE)
≤ε2(1− 1
M
)e
−H2(A1|[A]CX ,E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX
⊗ρE) +
1
M
e
ψ(1|ρ′[A]CX ,E
‖ρmix,[A]CX
⊗ρE)
=ε2(1− 1
M
)
|A|
qt
e−H2(A1,[A]CX |E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) +
1
M
e
ψ(1|ρ′[A]CX ,E
‖ρmix,[A]CX
⊗ρE)
=ε2(
|A|
qt
)e−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) +
1
M
|A|
qt
(e−H2([A]CX |E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) − ε2e−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE)).
Since the matrix ρ′A,E satisfies
e−H2([A]CX |E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) − e−H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) =
∑
a
TrEρ
′
E|aρ
− 12
E (
∑
a′∈CX+a\{a}
ρ′E|(a′))ρ
− 12
E
and
EX
∑
a
TrEρ
′
E|aρ
− 12
E (
∑
a′∈CX+a\{a}
ρ′E|(a′))ρ
− 12
E ≤
∑
a
TrEρ
′
E|aρ
− 12
E (ε1
qt
|A|
∑
a′ 6=a
ρ′E|(a′))ρ
− 12
E
≤ε1 q
t
|A|TrE
∑
a
ρ′E|aρ
− 12
E (
∑
a′
ρ′E|(a′))ρ
− 12
E = ε1
qt
|A|e
ψ(1|ρ′E‖ρE) ≤ ε1 q
t
|A| ,
we have
EXe
−H2([A]CX |E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) − ε2e−H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) ≤ EXe−H2([A]CX |E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) − e−H2(A|E|ρ′A,E‖ρE) ≤ ε1 q
t
|A| ,
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where the first inequality follows from ε2 ≥ 1.
Hence, we obtain
EX,Ye
−H2(fY(A1)|[A]CX ,E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX
⊗ρE) ≤ ε2( |A|
qt
)e−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE) +
1
M
ε1 =
1
M
ε1(1 +
ε2
ε1
|A|
qt
Me−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE)).
Applying Jensen’s inequality to x 7→ log x, we obtain
EX,Y −H2(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX ⊗ ρE) ≤− logM+ log ε1 + log(1 +
ε2
ε1
|A|
qt
Me−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE)).
Using (65), (17), and (19), we obtain
I ′(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρA,E) = logM−H(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρA,E)
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + logM−H(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E)
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + logM−H(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX ⊗ ρE)
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + logM−H2(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E‖ρmix,[A]CX ⊗ ρE). (121)
Hence, we obtain
EX,YI
′(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρA,E) ≤ 2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + log ε1 + log(1 +
ε2
ε1
|A|
qt
Me−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE))
≤2η(‖ρA,E − ρ′A,E‖1, log M˜) + log ε1 +
ε2
ε1
|A|
qt
Me−H2(A|E|ρ
′
A,E‖ρE). (122)
Applying the same discussion as the proof of Theorem 25, we obtain
EX,YI
′(fY(A1)|[A]CX , E|ρ′A,E) ≤ 2η((2(
|A|M
qt
)
s
2−s e−
s
2−sH1+s(A|E|ρ
′
A,E), log M˜+
vε2
4ε1
) + log ε1. (123)
E. Asymptotic analysis
Next, we consider the case when the c-q state is given as the n-fold independent and identical extension ρ⊗nA,B,E of a c-q
normalized state ρA,B,E , where A is Fq . Now, we fix codes C1,n in Fnq with the dimension ⌊n R1log q ⌋. Then, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 32: When {fX} is a universal2 ensemble of hash functions from Fnq /C1,n to F
⌊n
1−R1−R2
log q ⌋
q , the relations
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXd
′
1(fX(A1,n)|[An], En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ max0≤s≤1
s
2
(R2 − log q) + s
2
HG1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = eG,q(ρA,E | log q −R2),
(124)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXI
′(fX(A1,n)|[An], En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eG,q(ρA,E| log q −R2) (125)
hold.
Proof: (115) and (116) yield (124) and (125), respectively.
Similarly, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 33: When P (n) is an arbitrary polynomial and {fX} is a P (n)-almost dual universal2 ensemble of hash functions
from Fnq /C1,n to F
⌊n
1−R1−R2
log q ⌋
q , the relations (124) and (125) hold.
Proof: (117) and (118) yield Inequalities (124) and (125), respectively.
Next, we consider the case when the error correcting code is chosen randomly. In this case, the exponential decreasing rate
for I ′(fX(A1,n)|[An], En|PnA,E) can be improved as follows.
Theorem 34: For independent random variables X,Y, we assume that the code ensemble {CX} with the dimension ⌊n R1log q ⌋
is universal2 and {fY} is universal2 ensemble of hash functions from Fnq /CX to F
⌊n
1−R1−R2
log q ⌋
q , the relations (124), (116), and
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXPe[ρ
⊗n
A,B, CX] ≥ max
0≤s≤1
s(log q −R1)− sH1−s(A|B|ρA,B), (126)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥eH,q(PA,E | log q −R2) (127)
hold.
Proof: Theorem 31 implies that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ max0≤s≤1
s
2− s (R2 − log q +H1+s(A|E|ρA,E)) =eH,q(PA,E | log q −R2),
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which yields (127). Due to (114), the error probability can be bounded as
EXnPe[ρ
⊗n
A,B, CXn ] ≤ P (n)en(s(R1−log q)+sH1−s(A|B|ρA,B))
for s ∈ [0, 1], which implies (126).
Similarly, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 35: For an arbitrary polynomial P (n) and the independent random variables X,Y, we assume that the code
ensemble {CX} with the dimension ⌊n R1log q ⌋ is universal2 and {fY} is a P (n)-almost dual universal2 ensemble of hash
functions from Fnq /CX to F
⌊n
1−R1−R2
log q ⌋
q , the relations (124), (116), (126), and (127) hold.
For a comparison between two exponents eG,q(ρA,E |R) and eG,q(ρA,E |R), see Lemma 28.
VIII. APPLICATION TO GENERALIZED PAULI CHANNEL
A. General case
In order to apply the above result to quantum key distribution, we treat the quantum state generated by transmission by a
generalized Pauli channel in the p-dimensional system H. First, we define the discrete Weyl-Heisenberg representation W for
F
2
p:
X :=
p−1∑
j=0
|j + 1〉〈j|, Z :=
p−1∑
j=0
ωj |j〉〈j|, W(x, z) := XxZz,
where ω is the root of the unity with the order p. Using this representation and a probability distribution PXZ on F2p, we can
define the generalized Pauli channel:
EP (ρ) :=
∑
(x,z)∈F2p
PXZ(x, z)W(x, z)ρW(x, z)
†.
In the following, we assume that the eavesdropper can access all of the environment of the channel EP . When the state |j〉 is
input to the channel EP , the environment system is spanned by the basis {|x, z〉E}. Then, the state ρE|j of the environment
(Eve’s state) and Bob’s state ρB|j are given as
ρE|j =
p−1∑
z=0
PZ(z)|j, z : PXZ〉〈j, z : PXZ |, |j, z : PXZ〉 :=
p−1∑
x=0
ωjx
√
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉E
ρB|j =
p−1∑
x=0
PX(x)|j + x〉B B〈j + x|.
Thus, the relation
p−1∑
a=0
|a, z : PXZ〉〈j, z : PXZ | = p
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉E E〈x, z|
holds. Hence,
ρE =
∑
x,z
PX,Z(x, z)|x, z〉E E〈x, z|. (128)
Then, we obtain the following state after the quantum state transmission via the generalized Pauli channel.
ρA,B,E :=
p−1∑
j=0
1
p
|j〉〈j| ⊗ ρB|j ⊗ ρE|j .
In this setting, the joint state ρA,B is classical, we can apply the classical theory for error probability. Since PA,B(a, b) =∑
a
1
pPX(b − a), we have
e
−sHG1
1−s
(A|B|ρA,B)
=
∑
e
1
p
(
∑
a
PX(b − a)1/(1−s))1−s = (
∑
x
PX(x)
1/(1−s))1−s = e
(1−s) −s1−sH 1
1−s
(X|PX )
= e
−sH 1
1−s
(X|PX)
.
Now, we choose the rate R1 of size of code C1. When {CXn} is the P (n)-almost universal2 code ensemble in Fnq with the
dimension ⌊n R1log p⌋, due to [71, (243)], the decoding error probability can be bounded as
EXnPe[ρ
⊗n
A,B, CXn ] ≤P (n)e
n(s(R1−log q)−sH 1
1+s
(X|PX ))
.
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That is,
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EXnPe[ρ
⊗n
A,B, CXn ] ≥ max0≤s≤1 s(log q −R1) + sH 11+s (X |PX).
Next, we treat the leaked information. In the following discussion, we fix codes C1,n in Fnp . Since ρA,E =
∑
a
1
q |a〉〈a|⊗ρE|a,
we have
e
−sHG1
1−s
(A|E|ρA,E)
= TrE(TrA(
∑
a
1
p
|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a)
1
1−s )1−s =
1
p
TrE(
∑
a
(ρE|a)
1
1−s )1−s
=
1
p
TrE(
∑
a
p−1∑
z=0
PZ(z)
1
1−s |a, z : PXZ〉〈a, z : PXZ |)1−s = 1
p
TrE(
p−1∑
z=0
PZ(z)
1
1−s
∑
a
|a, z : PXZ〉〈a, z : PXZ |)1−s
=
1
p
TrE(
p−1∑
z=0
PZ(z)
1
1−s p
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉E E〈x, z|)1−s = p−sTrE
p−1∑
z=0
∑
x
PZ(z)PX|Z(x|z)1−s|x, z〉E E〈x, z|
=p−sesH1−s(X|Z|PX,Z) (129)
and
e−sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = Tr (
∑
a
1
p
|a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE|a)1+sρ−sE =
1
p1+s
∑
a
ρ1+sE|aρ
−s
E
=
1
p1+s
∑
a
∑
z
PZ(z)Tr |j, z : PXZ〉〈j, z : PXZ |1+s · (
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)|x, z〉E E〈x, z|)−s
=
1
p1+s
∑
a
∑
z
PZ(z)
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)1−s = 1
ps
∑
z
PZ(z)
∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)1−s = p−sesH1−s(X|Z|PX,Z ). (130)
That is, we have
H1+s(A|E|ρA,E) = HG1
1−s
(A|E|ρA,E) = log p−H1−s(X |Z|PX,Z). (131)
Now, we consider the case with randomized error correction. Given a sequence of fixed codes C1,n, we focus on a sequence of
ensembles of hash functions of Fnp/C1,n with the rate R2 of sacrifice information (i.e., with the sacrifice bit length L = nR2).
In this case, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρ⊗nE and TrA(ρ
⊗n
A,E)
1+s are less than (n + 1)(p2−1). Thus, when the code
ensemble {CX} with the dimension ⌊n R1log q ⌋ is universal2 and {fY} is a ε-almost dual universal2 ensemble of hash functions
from Fnq /CX to F
⌊n
1−R1−R2
log q ⌋
q , (117), (118), and (119) yield that
EX,Yd
′
1(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤(4 + (n+ 1)(p
2−1)/2
√
ε)e
n s2 (−R2+H 1
1+s
(X|Z|PX,Z ))
, (132)
EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤η
(
(4 + (n+ 1)(p
2−1)/2
√
ε)e
n s2 (−R2+H 1
1+s
(X|Z|PX,Z ))
, n log p
)
, (133)
EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤2η
(
2en
s
2−s (−R2+H1−s(X|Z|PX,Z )),
ε(n+ 1)(p
2−1)
4
+ n log p
)
. (134)
In particular, when {fY} is a universal2 ensemble of hash functions, due to (115), (116), and (120), the real number ε can be
replaced by 1 in the above inequalities.
Here, we need a remark for (133). The second input of the function η in (133) is n log p not 2n log p. In this case, the state
ρA is the uniform distribution, we can use (35) instead of (36). Hence, we can replace 2n log p by n log p.
The exponents eG,q(ρA,E | log p−R2) and eH,q(ρA,E| log p−R2) are calculated as
eG,q(ρA,E | log p−R2) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2
(R2 −H1− s1+s (X |Z|PX,Z)), (135)
eH,q(ρA,E | log p−R2) = max
0≤s≤1
s
2− s (R2 −H1−s(X |Z|PX,Z)) = max0≤t≤1
t
2
(R2 −H1− 2t2+t (X |Z|PX,Z)), (136)
where s2−s =
t
2 . In fact, our bound in (137) is the same as the bound obtained by the recent paper [19, (60)] via the phase
error correction approach. This fact seems the goodness of our bound and our approach.
Since s1+s ≤ 2s2+s for s ∈ [0, 1], Lemma 5 guarantees that H1− 2s2+s (X |Z|PX,Z) ≥ H1− s1+s (X |Z|PX,Z), which implies
eH,q(ρA,E | log p − R2) ≤ eG,q(ρA,E | log p− R2). That is, (133) gives a better exponent than (134). Since the relation (108)
holds due to (131), this case can be regard as a special case of Lemma 28. Thus, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EX,Yd
′
1(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ eG,q(ρA,E | log p−R2) (137)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ eG,q(ρA,E | log p−R2). (138)
However, there still exists a possibility that the evaluation (134) gives a better evaluation than (133) in the finite length setting.
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B. Independent case
Next, we consider the case when the two random variables X and Z are independent, Eve’s state ρE|j has the following
form:
ρE|j = |j : PX〉〈j : PX | ⊗
p−1∑
z=0
PZ(z)|z〉Z Z〈z|, |j : PX〉 :=
p−1∑
x=0
ωjx
√
PX(x)|x〉X .
In this case, the system spanned by {|z〉Z} has no correlation with j, and only the system spanned by {|x〉X} has correlation
with j. So, we can replace ρE|j by the following way:
ρE|j = |j : PX〉〈j : PX |.
In this case, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρE and TrAρ1+sA,E are less than p. Hence, the numbers of eigenvalues of ρ
⊗n
E and
TrA(ρ
⊗n
A,E)
1+s are less than (n+ 1)(p−1). When we choose ε = 1 for simplicity, the inequalities (132), (133), and (134) can
be simplified to
EX,Yd
′
1(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤(4 + (n+ 1)(p−1)/2)e
n s2 (−R2+H 1
1+s
(X|PX))
, (139)
EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤η((4 + (n+ 1)(p−1)/2)e
n s2 (−R2+H 1
1+s
(X|PX))
, n(log p)), (140)
EX,YI
′(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≤2η(2en
s
2−s (−R2+H1−s(X|PX )), (n+ 1)(p−1)/4 + n log p). (141)
Hence, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
− 1
n
log EX,Yd
′
1(fY(A1,n)|[An]CX , En|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ eG,q(ρA,E | log p−R2)
= max
0≤t≤1
t
2
(R2 −H 1
1+t
(X |PX)) = max
0≤s≤1/2
sR2 − sH1−s(PX)
2(1− s) . (142)
Here, we compare the evaluations (140) and (141). As is explained in the previous subsection, the exponent of (140) is
better than (141). This relation can be numerically checked in Fig. 1 with the parameters p = 2, PX(0) = 0.9, PX(1) = 0.1,
and R ∈ (0.53, 0.58). However, in the case of a finite n, − 1n logmin0≤s≤1 (RHS of (140)) is not necessarily larger than− 1n logmin0≤s≤1 (RHS of (141)). The relation between these two quantities is also numerically demonstrated in Fig. 1 with
the same parameters when n = 10, 000. This numerical result suggests that the exponents can not necessarily decide the order
of advantages with the finite size n when n is not sufficiently large.
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Fig. 1. Lower bounds of exponent. Thick dashed line: eG,q(ρA,E | log p − R2) = max0≤s≤1 s2 (R2 − H1− s1+s (X|PX)) Normal dashed line:
eH,q(ρA,E | log p − R2) = max0≤s≤1
s
2−s
(R2 − H1−s(X|PX)) = max0≤t≤1
t
2
(R2 − H1− 2t
2+t
(X|PX)) Thick line: − 1n logmin0≤s≤1 (RHS
of (140)), Normal line: − 1
n
logmin0≤s≤1 (RHS of (141)) with n = 10, 000, p = 2, PX(0) = 0.9, PX(1) = 0.1.
Next, we consider the case when there is no error in Z basis. In this case, it is sufficient to apply only privacy amplification.
Hence, we evaluate the upper bounds ∆d,2(enR, ε1|ρ⊗nA,E) as follows.
Lemma 36: When p = 2 and ρA,E =
∑
x∈F2
1
2 |x〉〈x| ⊗ |x : PX〉〈x : PX |, we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, ε1|ρ⊗nA,E) = eG,q(ρA,E|R) = max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s(log 2−R)
2(1− s) . (143)
Lemma 36 is proven in Appendix E.
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IX. CONCLUSION
We have derived upper bounds for the leaked information in the modified mutual information criterion and the L1 distin-
guishability criterion in the quantum case when we apply a family of universal2 hash functions or a family of ε-almost dual
universal2 hash functions for privacy amplification (Theorems 24 and 25 in Section V). Then, we have derived lower bounds
on their exponential decreasing rates in the i.i.d. setting. (Theorems 26 and 27 in Section VI). The obtained bound for the L1
distinguishability criterion has been shown to be tight in the qubit case when the state is generated by transmission via Pauli
channel (Appendix E). The obtained exponents are summarized in Table II. We have also applied our result to the case when
we need error correction. In this case, we apply the privacy amplification after error correction as given in Subsection VII-A.
Then, we have derived upper bounds for the information leaked with respect to the final keys in the respective criteria as well
as upper bounds for the probability for disagreement in the final keys (Theorems 29, 30, and 31 in Section VII). Applying
them to the i.i.d. setting, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates. (Theorems 32, 33, 34, and 35
in Section VII).
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF OBTAINED LOWER BOUNDS ON EXPONENTS.
Task L1 MMI
PV (Re´nyi) eG,q(ρA,E |R) eH,q(ρA,E |R),eG,q(ρA,E |R)
PV & fixed EC eG,q(ρA,E | log q −R2) eG,q(ρA,E | log q −R2)
PV & randomized EC no improvement eH,q(ρA,E | log q −R2)
eG,q(ρA,E | log q −R2)
R is the key generation rate. R2 is the sacrifice rate. PV (Re´nyi) is the exponent for privacy amplification via our approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy
of order 2. EC is error correction. L1 is the L1 distinguishability criterion. MMI is the modified mutual information criterion.
Since a family of ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions is a larger family of liner universal2 hash functions, the obtained
result suggests a possibility of the existence of an effective privacy amplification protocol with a smaller calculation time than
known privacy amplification protocols. In fact, as shown in the forthcoming paper [46], there exists an example of ε-almost dual
universal2 hash functions with a smaller calculation amount and smaller number of random variables than the concatenation
of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix. Hence, it is expected that the obtained evaluation has a future application from an
applied viewpoint.
In fact, our bounds have polynomial factors in the quantum setting. When the order of these polynomial factors are large,
the bounds do not work well when the number n is not sufficiently large. Fortunately, as is discussed in Subsection VI, some
of them have the order n3/2 at most. We can expect that these types of bounds work well even when the number n is not
sufficiently large. These types of bounds and these discussions have been extended to the case when error correction is needed.
Further, as is discussed in Subsubsection VI-C, we can expect that some of obtained bounds work well even in the non-i.i.d.
case.
In Section VIII, we have applied our result to the case when Eve obtains the all information leaked to the environment via
Pauli channel. In this case, our bounds can be described by using the joint classical distribution with respect to the bit error
and the phase error. We have numerically compared the obtained lower bounds on the exponential decreasing rates for leaked
information.
Due to Pinsker inequality and Inequality (36), the exponential convergence of one criterion yields the exponential convergence
of the other criterion. However, we have shown that better exponential decreasing rates can be obtained by separate derivations.
Our approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 yields the lower bound eG,q(PA,E |R) of the exponent of the L1
distinguishability criterion, which yields the lower bound eG,q(PA,E |R) of the exponent of the modified mutual information
criterion by using Pinsker inequality. Similarly, our approximate smoothing of Re´nyi entropy of order 2 yields the lower bound
eH,q(PA,E |R) of the exponent of the modified mutual information criterion, which yields the lower bound eH,q(PA,E |R)2 of the
exponent of the L1 distinguishability criterion by Inequality (34). Since eG,q(PA,E |R) ≥ eH,q(PA,E |R)2 , we can conclude that
the evaluation of the L1 distinguishability criterion becomes worse if it goes through another criterion. However, since we have
not derived the definitive relation between eH,q(PA,E |R) and eG,q(PA,E |R), we cannot say the same thing for the modified
mutual information criterion. The relation is also a future problem.
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APPENDIX A
MODIFIED MUTUAL INFORMATION CRITERION
It is natural to adopt a quantity expressing the difference between the true state and the ideal state ρmix,A⊗ρE as a security
criterion. However, there are several quantities expressing the difference between two states. Both d′1(A|E|ρ) and I ′(A|E|ρ)
are characterized in this way. Here, we show that the modified mutual criterion I ′(A|E|ρ) can be derived in a natural way.
It is natural assume the following condition for the security criterion C(A;E|ρ) as well as the unitary invariance on HE
and the permutation invariance on HA.
C1 Chain rule C(A,B|E|ρ) = C(B|E|ρ) + C(A|B,E|ρ).
C2 Linearity When two states ρ1 and ρ2 are distinghuishable on HE , C(A|E|λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) = λC(A|E|ρ1) + (1−
λ)C(A|E|ρ2).
C3 Range log dA ≥ C(A|E|ρ) ≥ 0.
C4 Ideal case C(A|E|ρmix,A ⊗ ρE) = 0.
C5 Normalization C(A|E||a〉〈a| ⊗ ρE) = log dA.
Unfortunately, the L1 distinguishability does not satisfies C1 Chain rule. However, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 37: The modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|ρ) = log dA −H(A|E|ρ) satisfies all of these conditions.
Further, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 38: When C(A|E|ρ) satisfies all of the above properties and ρ′ is written as∑a,e PA,E(a, e)|a, e〉〈a, e|, C(A|E|ρ′) =
I ′(A|E|ρ′) = log dA −H(A|E|ρ′).
That is, in the classical case, the security criterion is written by using the conditional entropy. In the quantum case, the
above theorem cannot determine uniquely the security criterion. Since the most natural quantum extension of the conditional
entropy is the quantum conditional entropy H(A|E|ρ). Hence, it is natural to adopt the modified mutual information criterion
I ′(A|E|ρ) as a security criterion. In particular, if one emphasizes C1 Chain rule rather than the universal composability, it is
better employ the modified mutual information criterion I ′(A|E|ρ).
Proof of Lemma 37: We can trivially check the conditions C4 Ideal case and C5 Normalization. We show other conditions.
C1 Chain rule can be shown as follows.
I ′(A,B|E|ρ) = log dA + log dB −H(A,B,E|ρ) +H(E|ρ)
= log dA + log dB −H(B,E|ρ) +H(E|ρ)−H(A,B,E|ρ) +H(B,E|ρ)
= log dA + log dB −H(B|E|ρ)−H(A|B,E|ρ) = I ′(A|B,E|ρ) + I ′(B|E|ρ).
When two states ρ1 and ρ2 are distinghuishable on HE ,
I ′(A|E|λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) = log dA −H(A,E|λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2) +H(E|λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2)
= log dA − λH(A,E|ρ1)− (1 − λ)H(A,E|ρ2)− h(λ) + λH(E|ρ1) + (1− λ)H(E|ρ2) + h(λ)
= log dA − λH(A,E|ρ1)− (1 − λ)H(A,E|ρ2) + λH(E|ρ1) + (1− λ)H(E|ρ2)
=λI ′(A|E|ρ1) + (1 − λ)I ′(A|E|ρ2),
which implies C2 Linearity.
I ′(A|E|ρ) = D(ρ‖ρmix,A ⊗ ρE) ≥ 0. Since ρ is separable, H(A,E|ρ) ≥ 0 [72]. Hence, I ′(A|E|ρ) satisfies C3 Range.
Proof of Theorem 38: We discuss H˜(A|E|ρ) := log dA − C(A|E|ρ). Due to C2 Linearity, we have
H˜(A|E|ρ) =
∑
e
PE(e)H˜(A|E|
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)|a, e〉〈a, e|).
Further, we see that the quantity H˜(A|E|∑a PA|E(a|e)|a, e〉〈a, e|) satisfies Khinchin’s axioms [73] for entropy due to the
remaining conditions. Hence, we find that H˜(A|E|∑a PA|E(a|e)|a, e〉〈a, e|) = H(PA|E=e). Thus, H˜(A|E|ρ) is equal to the
conditional entropy H(A|E|ρ). Hence, C(A|E|ρ) = I ′(A|E|ρ).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
First, we focus on the spectral decomposition of σ: σ =
∑
i siEi. Since x 7→ x
1+s
2 is operator concave,
Eiρ
1+s
2 Ei ≤ (EiρEi)
1+s
2 . (144)
When v is the number of eigenvectors of σ Inequality (7) implies
ρ
1+s
2 ≤ v
∑
i
Eiρ
1+s
2 Ei. (145)
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Since Ei and Ei′ are orthogonal to each other for i 6= i′,∑
i
(EiρEi)
1+s
2 = (
∑
i
EiρEi)
1+s
2 . (146)
Combining (144), (145), and (146), we obtain
σ−
s
4 ρ
1+s
2 σ−
s
4 ≤ vσ− s4
∑
i
Eiρ
1+s
2 Eiσ
− s4
≤v
∑
i
σ−
s
4 (EiρEi)
1+s
2 σ−
s
4 = vσ−
s
4 (Eσ(ρ))
1+s
2 σ−
s
4 .
Thus, (4) implies
eψ(s|ρ‖σ) = Tr (σ−
s
4 ρ
1+s
2 σ−
s
4 )2 ≤ vTr (σ− s4 (Eσ(ρ))
1+s
2 σ−
s
4 )2 = veψ(s|Eσ(ρ)‖σ) = veψ(s|Eσ(ρ)‖σ) ≤ veψ(s|ρ‖σ). (147)
That is, ψ(s|ρ‖σ) ≤ log v + ψ(s|ρ‖σ). When we denote the number of eigenvalues of σ⊗n by vn, we have
nψ(s|ρ‖σ) = ψ(s|ρ⊗n‖σ⊗n) ≤ log vn + ψ(s|ρ⊗n‖σ⊗n) = log vn + nψ(s|ρ‖σ). (148)
Dividing (148) by n and taking the limit n→∞, we obtain (5).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The convexity of ψ(s|ρ‖σ) is shown in [14, Exercises 2.24]. Using this fact, we obtain the desired argument with respect
to ψ(s|ρ‖σ). The convexity of ψ(s|ρ‖σ) can be shown in the following way:
dψ(s|ρ‖σ)
ds
=
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
,
d2ψ(s|ρ‖σ)
ds2
=
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2
2Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
+
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2
2Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
− (Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
)2.
Now, we consider two kinds of inner products between two matrices X and Y :
〈Y,X〉1 := TrXρ
1+s
2 Y †σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2, 〈Y,X〉2 := TrXρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 Y †σ−s/2.
Applying Schwarz inequality to the case of X = (log ρ− log σ) and Y = I , we obtain
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2 · Tr ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2 ≥ (Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2)2
and
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2 · Tr ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2 ≥(Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2)2.
Therefore,
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
≥(Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
)2,
Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ 1+s2 σ−s/2ρ 1+s2 (log ρ− log σ)σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
≥(Tr (log ρ− log σ)ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
Tr ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2ρ
1+s
2 σ−s/2
)2,
which implies
d2ψ(s|ρ‖σ)
ds2
≥ 0.
In particular, when ρ and σ are not completely mixed, the above inequalities are strict. Hence, the functions s 7→ ψ(s|ρ‖σ), ψ(s|ρ‖σ)
are strictly convex
28
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Assume that s ∈ (0,∞). For two non-negative matrices X and Y , the reverse operator Ho¨lder inequality
TrXY ≥ (TrX1/(1+s))1+s(Tr Y −1/s)−s
holds. Substituting
∑
a PA(a)
1+sρ1+sE|a and σ
−s
E to X and Y , we obtain
e−sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = Tr
∑
a
(PA(a)ρE|a)
1+sσ−sE ≥ (Tr (
∑
a
(PA(a)ρE|a)
1+s)1/(1+s))1+s(Trσ
−s·−1/s
E )
−s
=(Tr (
∑
a
(PA(a)ρE|a)
1+s)1/(1+s))1+s = e−sH
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E).
Since the equality holds when σE = (
∑
a(PA(a)ρE|a)
1+s)1/(1+s)/Tr (
∑
a(PA(a)ρE|a)
1+s)1/(1+s), we obtain
min
σE
e−sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) = e−sH
G
1+s(A|E|ρA,E),
which implies (21).
When s ∈ (−1, 0), applying the operator Ho¨lder inequality TrXY ≤ (TrX1/(1+s))1+s(Tr Y −1/s)−s instead of the reverse
operator Ho¨lder inequality, we obtain
e−sH1+s(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≤e−sHG1+s(A|E|ρA,E).
The equality can be shown in the same way.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 36
A. Outline of the proof
Since (96) implies
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR, ε1|ρ⊗nA,E) ≥ eG,q(ρA,E|R) = max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s(log 2−R)
2(1− s) , (149)
it is enough to show the opposite inequality. For this purpose, we will show the following lemma.
Lemma 39: When we choose an ⌈n(1−R)⌉-dimensional subspace CZ ⊂ Fn2 with equal probability, we obtain
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EZd
′
1([A]CZ |E|ρA,E) = max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s(1−R) log 2
2(1− s) . (150)
Here, we prove Lemma 36 by using Lemma 39. When we choose an ⌈n(1 − R′log 2 )⌉-dimensional subspace CZ ⊂ Fn2 with
equal probability, since the hash function X 7→ [X ]CZ satisfies the universal2 condition, we obtain
EZd
′
1([A]CZ |E|ρA,E) ≤ ∆d,2(2⌊n
R′
log 2 ⌋, 1|ρA,E) ≤ ∆d,2(enR′ , 1|ρA,E), (151)
which implies that
lim sup
n→∞
−1
n
log∆d,2(e
nR′ , 1|ρA,E) ≤ max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s(log 2−R′)
2(1− s) . (152)
Since Inequality (142) is the opposite inequality, we obtain (143).
In the following, we prepare two lemmas for the proof of Lemma 39. Given a code C ⊂ Fnp , we can define its orthogonal
space C⊥ ⊂ Fnp . Then, for [x2]C⊥ ∈ Fnp/C⊥ and x1 ∈ [x2]C⊥ , we define the conditional distribution PX|[X]C⊥ (x1|[x2]C⊥) :=
PX (x1)
P[X]
C⊥
([x2]C⊥ )
, where P[X]
C⊥
([x2]C⊥) :=
∑
x1∈[x2]C⊥
PX(x1). Then, we define a pure state |[a]C , [x2]C⊥〉 :=∑
x1∈[x2]C⊥
ωax1
√
P (x1|[x2]C⊥)|x1〉 for [a]C ∈ Fnp/C and [x2]C⊥ ∈ Fnp/C⊥. Note that the definition of the state |[a]C , [x2]C⊥〉
does not depend on the choice of the representatives of [a]C and [x2]C⊥ except for the phase factor. Then, the relation
ρE|[a]C :=
∑
y∈C
1
|C| |a+ y : PX〉〈j + y : PX | =
∑
[x2]C⊥∈F
n
p/C
⊥
PX([x2]C⊥)|[a]C , [x2]C⊥〉〈[a]C , [x2]C⊥ |.
holds. In order to describe the maximum likelihood estimator of the code C⊥ under the distribution PX , we define x([x2]C⊥) :=
argmaxx1∈[x2]C⊥ PX(x1). Then, the decoding error probability is given as
Pe(C
⊥) := 1−
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
PX(x([x2]))1 −
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
max
x1∈[x2]
PX(x1). (153)
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Lemma 40: The relation
2
∑
[x2]C⊥∈F
n
p/C
⊥
√
PX(x([x2]C⊥))(PX([x2]C⊥)− PX(x([x2]C⊥)))
≤d′1([A]C |E|ρA,E) = ‖ρE − ρE|[a]C‖1 (154)
≤2
√
2Pe(C⊥) (155)
holds for a ∈ Fn2 .
The proof of Lemma 40 is given in Appendix E-B.
Now, we consider the binary case, i.e., the case of Fn2 . We choose an m-dimensional subspace CX ⊂ Fn2 with equal
probability. That is, there are G(m) :=
∏m−1
i=0
2n−2i
2m−2i distinct m-dimensional subspaces in F
n
2 . Hence, we chose each of them
with the probability 1/G(m).
Lemma 41: When we choose an ⌈nR⌉-dimensional subspace CX ⊂ Fn2 with equal probability,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EX
∑
[x2]CX∈F
n
2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]CX))(P
n
X([x2]CX)− PnX(x([x2]CX)))
= lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EXPe(CX)
=
1
2
min
Q:log 2(1−R)≥H(Q)
D(Q‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q)
=
1
2
max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s log 2(1−R)
1− s . (156)
The proof of Lemma 41 is given in Appendix E-C.
Proof of Lemma 39: We apply Lemma 41 to the case CX = C⊥Z . Then, the exponential decreasing rates of the upper and
lower bounds given in Lemma 40 are max0≤s≤1/2 sH1−s(PX )−s(1−R) log 21−s , which implies (150).
B. Proof of Lemma 40
In this proof, we abbreviate [x]C⊥ by [x]. Since
‖ρE − ρE|[a]C‖1 = ‖W(0, z)(ρE − ρE|[a]C )W(0, z)†‖1 = ‖ρE − ρE|[a+z]C‖1 (157)
for z, a ∈ Fnp , we have d′1([A]C |E|ρA,E) = ‖ρE − ρE|[a]C‖1.
Next, we prove the inequality (155). For this purpose, we define the fidelity as F (ρE , ρE|[a]C ) := Tr |
√
ρE
√
ρE|[a]C |. The
fidelity satisfies that
‖ρE − ρE|[a]C‖1 ≤ 2
√
1− F (ρE , ρE|[a]C)2, (158)
and is characterized as
F (ρE , ρE|[a]C)
2 =
( ∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
PX([x2])
√ ∑
x1∈[x2]
PX|[X](x1|[x2])2
)2
= e−H
G
2 (X|[X]|PX). (159)
Since e−HG2 (X|[X]|PX) ≥
(∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥ PX([x2])maxx1∈[x2] PX|[X](x1|[x2])
)2
= (1− Pe(C⊥))2, we have
1− e−H2(X|[X]|PX) ≤ 1− (1− Pe(C⊥))2 = 1− 1 + 2Pe(C⊥)− Pe(C⊥)2 ≤ 2Pe(C⊥). (160)
Combining (158), (159), and (160), we obtain (155).
Next, we show (154). For x1 ∈ [x2]\{x([x2])}, we define the operatorKx1 := |x1〉〈x1|+
√
PX(x1)
PX([x2])−PX (x([x2]))
|x([x2])〉〈x([x2 ])|.
Then, we have the relation
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
K2x1 = I . Hence, we can define the TP-CP map Λ : ρ 7→∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
Kx1ρKx1 ⊗ |x1〉R R〈x1|, where {|x1〉R} is a CONS on another system. Thus,
Kx1ρEKx1 = PX(x1)|x1〉〈x1|+
PX(x1)PX(x([x2]))
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2])) |x([x2])〉〈x([x2 ])|
Kx1ρE|[a]Kx1 = (
√
PX(x1)|x1〉+
√
PX(x1)PX(x([x2]))
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2])) |x([x2])〉)(〈x1
√
PX(x1)|+ 〈x([x2])|
√
PX(x1)PX(x([x2]))
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2])) ).
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Hence,
‖Kx1ρEKx1 −Kx1ρE|[a]Kx1‖1 = 2
√
PX(x1)
√
PX(x1)PX(x([x2]))
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2]))
=2
PX(x1)
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2]))
√
PX(x([x2]))(PX([x2])− PX(x([x2]))). (161)
Using the relation
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
PX (x1)
PX ([x2])−PX (x([x2]))
= 1 and (161), we obtain
‖ρE − ρE|[a]C‖1 ≥ ‖Λ(ρE)− Λ(ρE|[[a])‖1
≥
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
‖Kx1ρEKx1 −Kx1ρE|[a]CKx1‖1
≥
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
‖Kx1ρEKx1 −Kx1ρE|[a]CKx1‖1
=2
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
∑
x1∈[x2]\{x([x2])}
PX(x1)
PX([x2])− PX(x([x2]))
√
PX(x([x2]))(PX([x2])− PX(x([x2])))
=2
∑
[x2]∈Fnp/C
⊥
√
PX(x([x2]))(PX ([x2])− PX(x([x2]))),
which implies (154).
C. Proof of Lemma 41
In this proof, we abbreviate [x]CX by [x]. It was shown in [19, Theorem 7] that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EXPe(CX) ≥ max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s log 2(1−R)
1− s . (162)
We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 42:
max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s log 2(1−R)
1− s
= min
Q:log 2(1−R)≥H(Q)
D(Q‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q). (163)
Lemma 42 is shown in Appendix E-E.
Hence, it is enough to show that
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≤1
2
min
Q:log 2(1−R)≥H(Q)
D(Q‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q) (164)
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≥1
2
max
0≤s≤1/2
−sH1−s(PX) + s log 2(1−R)
1− s . (165)
Now, we denote the set of empirical distributions on F2 with n trials by Tn. The cardinality |Tn| is n+1 [34]. When Tn(Q)
represents the set of n-trial data whose empirical distribution is Q, the cardinality of Tn(Q) can be evaluated as [34]:
⌈e
nH(Q)
n+ 1
⌉ ≤ |Tn(Q)| ≤ ⌊enH(Q)⌋, (166)
where ⌈x⌉ is the minimum integer m satisfying m ≥ x, and ⌊x⌋ is the maximum m satisfying m ≤ x. Since any element
~a ∈ Tn(Q) satisfies
PnX(~a) = e
−n(D(Q‖PX )+H(Q)), (167)
we obtain an important formula
1
n+ 1
e−nD(Q‖PX ) ≤ PnX(Tn(Q)) ≤ e−nD(Q‖PX ). (168)
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Now, we prepare the following lemma in the finite-length case.
Lemma 43: Assume that we choose an m-dimensional subspace CX ⊂ Fn2 with equal probability. When Q1, Q2 ∈ Tn
satisfies that H(Q1) ≤ 2n−m and D(Q1‖PX) +H(Q1) < D(Q2‖PX) +H(Q2), we have
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2]))) ≥ Bn,m(Q1, Q2) (169)
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2]))) ≤ e−
1
2 max0≤s≤1
nsH1−s(PX )−s(n−m) log 2
1−s , (170)
where
Bn,m(Q1, Q2) := e
−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1)+D(Q2‖PX)+H(Q2))
|Tn(Q2)|(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)(1− (2
m−2)(|Tn(Q1)|−2)
2(2n−2) )2
m−n
(1 + |Tn(Q2)|−1
2n−2
2m−2−
|Tn(Q1)|−2
2
)
1
2
. (171)
The proof of Lemma 43 is given in Appendix E-D.
Since (170) shows (165), we will show (164) by using (169). When log 2(1 − R) < H(Q1) and D(Q1‖PX) +H(Q1) <
D(Q2‖PX) +H(Q2),
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logBn,⌊nR⌋(Q1, Q2) =
1
2
(D(Q1‖PX) +D(Q2‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1)). (172)
Choosing Q1 = PX , we have
inf
Q1,Q2:log 2(1−R)<H(Q1),D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1)<D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2)
1
2
(D(Q1‖PX) +D(Q2‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1))
= inf
Q1:log 2(1−R)<H(Q1)
1
2
(D(Q1‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1)). (173)
Thus,
inf
Q1:log 2(1−R)<H(Q1)
D(Q1‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1)
= min
Q1:log 2(1−R)≤H(Q1)
D(Q1‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1) ≥ min
Q1:log 2(1−R)≤H(Q1)
D(Q1‖PX).
Since the minimum minQ1:log 2(1−R)<H(Q1)D(Q1‖PX) can be realized with Q∗1 satisfying log 2(1−R) = H(Q∗1), we have
inf
Q1:log 2(1−R)<H(Q1)
D(Q1‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1)
= min
Q1:log 2(1−R)≤H(Q1)
D(Q1‖PX) = D(Q∗1‖PX). (174)
It is known that this quantity is the optimal error exponent with the source coding with the compression rate log 2(1 − R),
which is equal to max0≤s≤1/2 sH1−s(PX )−s log 2(1−R)1−s . Hence, combining (169), (169), (174), and the above mentioned fact,
we obtain (156).
Proof of (172): Since log 2(1−R) < H(Q1), we have
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log(1− (2
m − 2)(|Tn(Q1)| − 2)
2(2n − 2) ) = 0
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log
|Tn(Q2)| − 1
2n−2
2m−2 − |Tn(Q1)|−22
= H(Q2)− log 2(1−R).
Hence,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
log
|Tn(Q2)|(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)2m−n
(1 + |Tn(Q2)|−12n−2
2m−2−
|Tn(Q1)|−2
2
)
1
2
=H(Q2) +H(Q1)− log 2(1−R)− 1
2
(H(Q2)− log 2(1−R)) = H(Q2) +R− log 2
2
+H(Q1).
Thus,
lim
n→∞
−1
n
logBn,⌊nR⌋(Q1, Q2) =
1
2
(D(Q1‖PX) +H(Q1) +D(Q2‖PX) +H(Q2))− H(Q2)− log 2(1−R)
2
+H(Q1)
=
1
2
(D(Q1‖PX) +D(Q2‖PX) + log 2(1−R)−H(Q1)),
which implies (172).
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D. Proof of Lemma 43
In this proof, we abbreviate [x]CX by [x]. In Lemma 43, we choose an m-dimensional subspace CX ⊂ Fn2 with equal
probability. That is, there are G(m) :=
∏m−1
i=0
2n−2i
2m−2i distinct m-dimensional subspace in F
n
2 . Hence, we chose each of them
with the probability 1/G(m).
Now, we show (170). Since x 7→ √x is concave for s ∈ [0, 1], we have
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
=EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX(x([x2]))
√
(PnX([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
PnX(x([x2]))
≤EX
√√√√ ∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX(x([x2]))
(PnX([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
PnX(x([x2]))
=EX
√ ∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX([x2])− PnX(x([x2]))
≤
√
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX([x2])− PnX(x([x2])). (175)
Since the quantity
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX([x2])−PnX(x([x2])) is the average error probability when we apply maximum likelihood
decoder, it can be evaluated as ∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
PnX([x2])− PnX(x([x2])) ≤ 2
s(n−m)
1−s (
∑
x∈F2
PX(x)
1−s)
n
1−s (176)
with s ∈ [0, 12 ]. Combining (175) and (176), we obtain (170).
Next, we proceed to the proof of (169). For distinct elements y1, . . . , yl, yl+1, . . . , yl+k ∈ Fn2 , we define the number
M(y1, . . . , yl|yl+1, . . . , yl+k) as the number of cases that one of y1, . . . , yl belongs to CX and one of yl+1, . . . , yl+k belongs
to CX. In particular, M(y1, . . . , yl|∅) denotes the number of cases that one of y1, . . . , yl belongs to CX. Then, we prepare the
following lemma.
Lemma 44:
M(y1, y2, . . . , yl|yl+1) ≤l
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i (177)
M(y1, y2, . . . , yl|∅) ≥l( 2
n − 21
2m − 21 −
l − 1
2
)
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i . (178)
The proof of Lemma 44 is given in the end of this subsection.
Now, using Lemma 44, we show (169). We define a([x2]) to be 1 if [x2] ∩ Tn(Q1) 6= ∅, and to be 0 otherwise. We also
define N([x2]) the number of elements of [x2] ∩ Tn(Q2). Then, for any code C and any [x2] ∈ Fn2/C,√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≥a([x2])e−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−n2 (D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))
√
N([x2])
=a([x2])e
−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−
n
2 (D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))N([x2])N([x2])
− 12 . (179)
Next, for x ∈ Fn2 , we define b(C, x) to be 1 if (x + C) ∩ Tn(Q1) 6= ∅, and to be 0 otherwise. We also define the number
N(C, x) as the number of elements of (x + C) ∩ Tn(Q2). Hence,∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /C
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≥
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /C
a([x2])e
−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−
n
2 (D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))N([x2])N([x2])
− 12
=
∑
x∈Tn(Q2)
b(C, x)e−
n
2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−
n
2 (D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))N(C, x)−
1
2 .
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Thus,
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≥EX
∑
x∈Tn(Q2)
b(CX, x)e
−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−
n
2 (D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))N(CX, x)
− 12
≥
∑
x∈Tn(Q2)
PX(b(CX, x) = 1)e
−n2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1))e−
n
2 (D(Q2‖PX)+H(Q2))(EX|b(CX,x)=1N(CX, x))
− 12 . (180)
Now, we evaluate the values PX(b(CX, x) = 1) and EX|b(CX,x)=1N(CX, x).
The condition (x + CX) ∩ Tn(Q1) 6= ∅ is equivalent with the condition CX ∩ (Tn(Q1) − x) 6= ∅, where (Tn(Q1) −
x) := ∪y∈Tn(Q1)(y − x). When y1, . . . , yl are all non-zero elements of (Tn(Q1) − x) for a fixed x, the number of cases
that CX ∩ (Tn(Q1) − x) 6= ∅ is M(y1, . . . , yl|∅). Lemma 44 guarantees that M(y1, . . . , yl|∅) ≥ (|Tn(Q1)| − 1)( 2n−22m−2 −
|Tn(Q1)|−2
2 )
∏m−1
i=2
2n−2i
2m−2i . Thus,
PX(b(CX, x) = 1) ≥(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)( 2
n − 2
2m − 2 −
|Tn(Q1)| − 2
2
)
2m(2m − 2)
2n(2n − 2)
=(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)(1− (2
m − 2)(|Tn(Q1)| − 2)
2(2n − 2) )2
m−n. (181)
The number N(C, x) is the number of elements of C ∩ (Tn(Q2) − x). For any non-zero element y′ ∈ (Tn(Q2) − x),
M(y1, . . . , yl|y′) ≤ l
∏m−1
i=2
2n−2i
2m−2i . Hence, we have
EX|b(CX,x)=1N(CX, x) = 1 +
∑
y′∈(Tn(Q2)−x)\{0}
PX|b(CX,x)=1(y
′ ∈ CX)
=1 +
∑
y′∈(Tn(Q2)−x)\{0}
M(y1, . . . , yl|y′)
M(y1, . . . , yl|∅) ≤ 1 +
∑
y′∈(Tn(Q2)−x)\{0}
1
2n−2
2m−2 − |Tn(Q1)|−22
= 1 +
|Tn(Q2)| − 1
2n−2
2m−2 − |Tn(Q1)|−22
. (182)
Combining (180), (181), and (182), we obtain
EX
∑
[x2]∈Fn2 /CX
√
PnX(x([x2]))(P
n
X([x2])− PnX(x([x2])))
≥
∑
x∈Tn(Q2)
e−
n
2 (D(Q1‖PX)+H(Q1)+D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))
(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)(1− (2
m−2)(|Tn(Q1)|−2)
2(2n−2) )2
m−n
(1 + |Tn(Q2)|−1
2n−2
2m−2−
|Tn(Q1)|−2
2
)
1
2
=e−
n
2 (D(Q1‖PX )+H(Q1)+D(Q2‖PX )+H(Q2))
|Tn(Q2)|(|Tn(Q1)| − 1)(1− (2
m−2)(|Tn(Q1)|−2)
2(2n−2) )2
m−n
(1 + |Tn(Q2)|−1
2n−2
2m−2−
|Tn(Q1)|−2
2
)
1
2
, (183)
which implies (169).
Proof of Lemma 44: We fix the one-dimensional subspace spanned by a non-zero element y1 ∈ Fn2 . We count the number
of m− 1 dimensional subspaces that are orthogonal to y1 and belong to CX. Hence, M(y1|∅) is
∏m−1
i=1
2n−2i
2m−2i .
Next, we consider two elements y1 and y2. We fix the two-dimensional subspace spanned by y1 and y2 in Fn2 . We count
the number of m− 2 dimensional subspaces that are orthogonal to the two-dimensional subspace and belong to CX. Hence,
M(y1|y2) is
∏m−1
i=2
2n−2i
2m−2i . Thus,
M(y1, y2|∅) = M(y1|∅) +M(y2|∅)−M(y1|y2)
=2
m−1∏
i=1
2n − 2i
2m − 2i −
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i = (2
2n − 21
2m − 21 − 1)
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i .
We consider l+1 elements y1, y2, . . . , yl, yl+1 ∈ Fn2 \ {0}. We focus on the two-dimensional subspace C′ spanned by yl+1
and one of y1, . . . , yl. The number of choices of C′ is at most l. When we fix the subspace C′, we consider the number of
cases what m− 2 dimensional space of the orthogonal space belongs CX. This number of cases is
∏m−1
i=2
2n−2i
2m−2i . Hence, we
obtain (177).
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Using (177), we can show (178) with l = 3 as follows.
M(y1, y2, y3|∅) =M(y1|∅) +M(y2|∅) +M(y3|∅)−M(y1|y2)−M(y1, y2|y3)
≥3
m−1∏
i=1
2n − 2i
2m − 2i − (1 + 2)
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i = (3
2n − 21
2m − 21 − 3)
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i .
Similarly, using (177), we can show (178) in the general case as follows.
M(y1, y2, . . . , yl|∅) =M(y1|∅) +M(y2|∅) + . . .+M(yl|∅)−M(y1|y2)−M(y1, y2|y3)− . . .−M(y1, . . . , yl−1|yl)
≥l
m−1∏
i=1
2n − 2i
2m − 2i − (1 + 2 + . . .+ (M − 1))
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i = (l
2n − 21
2m − 21 −
l(l − 1)
2
)
m−1∏
i=2
2n − 2i
2m − 2i .
E. Proof of Lemma 42
It is enough to show that
max
0≤s≤1/2
−f(s) + sr
1− s = minQ:r≥H(Q)D(Q‖PX) + r −H(Q), (184)
where f(s) := sH1−s(PX). Since both quantities are zero when r ≤ H(PX), it is enough to show (184) with r > H(PX).
We define the distribution Ps(x) := PX(x)1−s/
∑
x′ PX(x
′)1−s. Since f(s) is strictly convex, f ′(s) is strictly increasing.
Hence, we can define the function s(t) as the inverse function s 7→ f ′(s). Since
d
dt
(1− s(t))t+ f(s(t)) = 1− s(t)− s′(t)t+ s′(t)f ′(s(t)) = 1− s(t) > 0 (185)
for s(t) ∈ [0, 1), we can define tr as
r = (1 − s(tr))tr + f(s(tr)). (186)
Then, we have s(H(PX)) = 0, tH(PX ) = H(PX), and tH(Ps) = f ′(s).
Hence, when r ∈ [H(PX), H(P1)], we obtain
tr − r = trs(tr)− f(s(tr)) = s(tr)r − f(s(tr))
1− s(tr) = maxs∈[0,1]
sr − f(s)
1− s , (187)
which is shown below. In the following, we denote the above value by g(r). Hence, we obtain
max
s∈[0,1/2]
sr − f(s)
1− s =
{
s(tr)r−f(s(tr))
1−s(tr)
if s(tr) ≥ 1/2
H(P1/2)/2−f(1/2)
1−1/2 r −H(P1/2) if s(tr) < 1/2.
(188)
We can also show
d
dr
g(r) =
s(tr)
1− s(tr) . (189)
Its proof is given below. By simple calculation, we obtain
D(Ps‖PX) = sf ′(s)− f(s). (190)
When H(Q) = H(Ps), we can show
D(Q‖PX)−D(Ps‖PX) = D(Q‖Ps)
1− s . (191)
Its proof is given below. Combining (187), (190), and (191), we obtain
max
s∈[0,1]
sr − f(s)
1− s = minQ:r=H(Q)D(Q‖PX) = D(Ps(tr)‖PX) = s(tr)tr − f(s(tr)). (192)
Hence, (189) and (192) yield that
min
Q:r≥H(Q)
D(Q‖PX) + r −H(Q) = min
r′:r≥r′
g(r′) + r − r′ =
{
g(r′) if s(tr) ≥ 1/2
g(H(P1/2) + r −H(P1/2) if s(tr) < 1/2. (193)
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Therefore, combination of (188) and (193) yields (184).
Proof of (187): The first equation follows from (186). The second equation can be shown by substituting tr = r−f(s(tr))1−s(tr) .
Now, we show the final equation. We have
d
ds
sr − f(s)
1− s =
(1− s)(r − f ′(s)) + sr − f(s)
(1− s)2 . (194)
Since
d
ds
(1− s)(r − f ′(s)) + sr − f(s) = −f ′′(s)(1 − s), (195)
(1 − s)(r − f ′(s)) + sr − f(s) is monotonically increasing for s, Hence, the maximum maxs∈[0,1] sr−f(s)1−s is realized when
(1 − s)(r − f ′(s)) + sr − f(s) = 0, which is equivalent with s = s(tr) because of (186). Therefore, we obtain the final
equation.
Proof of (189): Thanks to the proof of (187), we have ddr sr−f(s)1−s |r=s(tr) = 0. Hence,
d
dr
s(tr)r − f(s(tr))
1− s(tr) =
s(tr)− f(s(tr))
1− s(tr) +
ds(tr)
dr
d
dr
sr − f(s)
1− s |r=s(tr) =
s(tr)− f(s(tr))
1− s(tr) . (196)
Proof of (191): We have
D(Q‖PX)−D(Ps‖PX) =
∑
x
Q(x)(logQ(x)− logPX(x)) −
∑
x
Ps(x)(log Ps(x) − logPX(x))
=
∑
x
Q(x)(logQ(x) − logPs(x)) +
∑
x
(Q(x) − Ps(x))(log Ps(x)− logPX(x))
=D(Q‖Ps)− s
∑
x
(Q(x)− Ps(x)) logPX(x)
and
−H(Q) +H(Ps) =
∑
x
Q(x)(logQ(x)− logPs(x)) +
∑
x
(Q(x) − Ps(x)) log Ps(x)
=D(Q‖Ps) + (1− s)
∑
x
(Q(x) − Ps(x)) log PX(x).
Since H(Q) = H(Ps), we obtain (191).
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